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SUMMARY 
Recent literature on industrial districts and enterprise clusters 
suggests that the grouping of enterprises into sectoral and 
geographic clusters gives rise to a certain collective efficiency 
that can enhance competitiveness and foster industrialisation. 
This paper reports the results of an analysis of eight African 
enterprise clusters: three in Kenya that were the subject of 
original research, and five others for which substantial 
secondary literature was available. The study addresses three 
questions: First, do the clusters have the characteristics 
associated with successful industrial districts elsewhere? 
Second, to what extent have they been able to respond to 
opportunities and shocks in their environment? And third, how 
closely are these clusters linked to the wider industrialisation 
process in their countries? The research found that only two of 
the eight clusters have the internal structure and wider market 
access that generally go with successful industrial districts, but 
that even these two are at very different levels of development. 
The rest of the clusters consist almost entirely of 
microenterprises selling in localised markets. Nearly all of the 
clusters could be said to be in some way involved with their 
country's industrialisation process, but the nature of that 
i 
involvement varies with the level of development of the cluster. 
The first group consists of small-enterprise clusters that lay the 
groundwork for industrialisation by developing basic skills and 
fostering the transition from craft to factory production. The 
next group of clusters, which has clearer signs of collective 
efficiency, is characterised by greater specialisation and 
differentiation of firms, bilateral production linkages, and 
somewhat higher technologies. The final group consists of 
clusters with large as well as small firms that aim at wider 
markets and are generally able to produce competitively. The 
paper draws implications from the findings about the 
appropriate support for clusters at each stage, and makes 
suggestions for further research. 
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1 Introduction1 
The place is alive with activity and the sound of hammers on 
metal. This is Kamukunji, one of Nairobi's best known jua kali 
s i tes . 2 Hundreds of artisans and their trainees are fabricating metal 
products - brightly painted boxes, wheelbarrows, charcoal stoves, 
cooking pots and utensils, and many more - for sale to wholesalers and 
direct to consumers. The place is hot and dusty, with few amenities. 
Most of the artisans still work without shelter, despite the addition 
over 10 years ago of a few large roofed sheds. Less than a kilometre 
away is Nairobi 's industrial area, home to companies with names like 
Metal Equipment, Zenith Steel, New World Industries. Although the 
roads are breaking down and the power supply is erratic at best, the 
factories of the industrial area immediately convey the impression that 
industrialisation is happening in Kenya. But is industrialisation 
conf ined to the factories? Or is Kamukunji somehow part of the 
process? 
This paper explores the link between clusters of enterprises, many of 
them not unlike Kamukunji and the industrialisation process in Africa. 
More specifically, the aim is to examine the ability of clusters to make 
a posit ive contribution to developing Afr ica 's capacity for industrial 
activity. Original research has been carried out on two sets of 
enterprise clusters in Kenya: one of motor vehicle repair enterprises in 
1 
ids Dp no. 295 
Nairobi and Thika, and another of fish processing in the Lake Victoria 
region. As background for those studies, a review of secondary sources 
of information on clusters in Africa was conducted. The information 
was difficult to obtain because, like much African scholarship, it is 
more often contained in conference papers and consultancy reports, 
than in published books or articles. An initial attempt to gather 
materials by faxing requests to relevant departments in African 
universities failed miserably. What is reported, therefore, is the result 
of mining my own academic network. Not surprisingly, most of the 
studies reported are from English-speaking countries, and a 
disproportionate share of the references come from Kenya. The 
coverage of clusters is not exhaustive, nor do the studies of clusters 
reported use similar methodologies or pursue the same questions. My 
selection was based 011 two criteria: first, the existence of a single 
study or group of studies describing the cluster that provided 
information on the key variables in the analysis; and second, a pie-
screening that attempted to identify clusters with actual or potential 
links to the industrialisation process. Hopefully, as this paper is shared 
and discussed across the continent, additional materials will surface, 
enabling us to correct the errors and misconceptions that may have 
arisen from the imbalance of case study representation. 
The original research focused 011 two questions: First , do (he African 
2 
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clusters have the characteristics associated with successful industrial 
districts elsewhere? And second, to what extent have they been able 
to respond to opportunities and shocks in their environment? To the 
extent possible from the available material, the paper has addressed the 
same questions in the review of the case study material. The analysis 
attempts to go beyond simple answers to these questions to explore a 
third question: how closely are these clusters linked the the wider 
industrialisation process in their countries? 
The paper is organised into six parts. Following this introduction is 
the theoretical discussion of the relationship of enterprise clusters to 
industrialisation. Then Part 3 examines three clusters that, although at 
a very basic level of development, appear to be laying the groundwork 
for future industrialisation. Part 4 analyses three other clusters that 
show unmistakable signs of actual industrialisation, and Part 5 
examines two clusters that have some of the internal diversity and 
ability to reach wider product markets typical of industrial districts. 
The final section draws conclusions from the analysis. 
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2 ENTERPRISE CLUSTERS IN THE INDUSTRIALISATION 
PROCESS 
Before attempting to establish the theoretical links between clustering 
and industrialisation, it is useful to delineate more precisely the 
meaning of an enterprise cluster. 
2.1 Enterprise Clusters 
The term cluster is used in two somewhat different ways in the 
industrial development literature. Porter (1990) uses the term to 
designate a group of firms engaged in similar or related activities 
within a national economy. Although Porter (1990: 761) believes that 
the relationships within an industry cluster benefit from firms being 
located near one another, he does not consider geographic proximity 
to be a defining characteristic of clusters. 
The second use of the term is explicitly geographic. According to 
Schmitz (1992), a cluster is characterised by a geographic and 
sectoral agglomeration of enterprises. This approach has its roots in 
Marshall's (1890) analysis on the textile and metalworking districts of 
England, Germany, and France during the latter half of the nineteenth 
centuiy. It has recently been elaborated in studies of highly successful 
industrial districts in various parts of the world (see, for example, Piore 
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and Sabel 1984; Zeitlin 1989; Storper and Walker 1989; Becaltini 
1989; Sengenberger and Pyke 1992; Humplirey 1995).3 
This study adopts the second definition, because geographic 
proximity appears to be particularly important in developing countries 
where poor infrastructure, weak information systems, and cultures that 
place high value on face-to-face communication are the norm. 
The discussion of developing country enterprise clusters tends to 
focus on how closely they resemble successful industrial districts 
elsewhere. This is a useful and perhaps necessaiy exercise, but not the 
end-point of cluster analysis. The many clusters that fail to measure up 
as industrial districts are not a homogeneous group, and the differences 
among them may well provide important insights into their potential 
as means of industrialisation. 
Clusters can also be understood by examining their different patterns 
of specialisation and cooperation. Pedersen (1997: 23-24), from a 
preliminary analysis of African clusters, identifies four general types: 
(1) the diversified industrial cluster; (2) the subcontractor cluster; (3) 
the market town or distribution centre; and (4) the specialised petty 
commodity cluster, with enterprises specialised horizontally. The 
breakdown has obvious roots in the African reality and, as Pederseiv s 
(1997: 27) conclusions show, is useful in tailoring policy to a 
particular setting. The typology is less helpful in furthering the 
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analysis of cluster dynamics or in identifying the contribution of 
clusters to the industrialisation process. 
2.2 Clusters and the Industrialisation Process 
Industrialisation, like the broader process of development of which it 
is a part, generally involves increasing complexity of production 
which, in turn, demands greater reliance on others for certain activities 
(Mead 1994). Enterprise clustering can affect industrialisation by 
making it easier for this process of specialisation and differentiation to 
take place. 
When firms undertake related activities in close geographic 
proximity, both the immediate environment and the firms themselves 
are likely to change. The environment begins to adapt to the presence 
of the firms by attracting customers, traders, workers with related 
skills, individuals and firms wanting to offer services, and still more 
enterprises anxious to benefit from the markets being created. Old 
institutions change and new ones spring up. Some developments 
happen spontaneously; others occur only when the firms in the cluster 
take collective action. For example, traders may simply appear because 
they heard of the existence of the cluster, but government may have to 
be persuaded to improve infrastructure. 
As the environment changes, so do the firms. At its most basic level, 
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clustering seems to encourage information sharing and opportunities 
for learning new techniques and designs. Sometimes firms then modify 
their own operations. One firm may specialise in some aspect of the 
production process while another turns from production to trade in 
inputs or final products. Still another firm may develop links with 
traders who visit the cluster. 
In short, clustering appears to have the potential to enable African 
countries to overcome or ease some of the barriers to industrial 
development. By increasing market access, fostering communication 
and information sharing, facilitating technological upgrading, 
increasing efficiency, and contributing to the development of 
supportive institutions, clusters can build industrial capacity. In this 
way, clustering can provide gains not easily available to dispersed 
enterprises. These gains have been termed collective efficiency, 
defined as the competitive advantage derived from local external 
economies and joint action (Schmitz 1995). 
Schmitz (1995) highlights the two dimensions of collective 
efficiency: the planned and the unplanned, or in Nadvi's (1996) terms, 
the active and the passive. External economies are rooted in the fact 
that the benefits of economic action tend to spill over to other actors. 
The external effect is an unintended by-product of some other activity 
(Mishan 1971). Schmitz (1997: 8) further argues that responding to 
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opportunities and crises requires shifting gears from the passive 
aspects of collective efficiency (external economies) to active 
collective efficiency (Schmitz 1997: 8). Before discussing these in 
greater detail, however, it is useful first to consider some aspects of the 
environment in which clusters are situated. 
2.3 Economic Context for Clustering 
Each cluster operates in a particular economic context. This context, 
which is known to be critical to the performance of individual firms, 
should be similarly important to the growth and development of 
enterprise clusters. Three elements, borrowed from the industrial 
organisation literature (see, for example, Scherer 1980) and 
institutional economics (see Williamson 1985, North 1990, Langlois 
and Robertson 1995) seem pertinent: the nature and size of the product 
market, available economies of scale and scope, and the institutions 
governing exchange relations. 
2.3.1 Nature and size of product market 
A cluster might be well-endowed and operating efficiently, but without 
a market for its products, it will die. Markets have always been in the 
background of the discussions of clusters and flexible specialisation, 
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but they have not always received the explicit analysis they need and 
deserve. A full treatment of the subject would require another paper, 
so this discussion will focus on two aspects only: the nature of the 
product and the sticky issue of market size. 
The nature of a cluster's products obviously has an impact on they 
way they are marketed. Some products of small enterprise are inferior 
goods for which demand can be expected to fall as consumer incomes 
rise. Stoves and cooking utensils made of scrap metal, and rubber tyre 
sandals are two good examples of this type of product. Consumer, 
intermediate, and capital goods have different markets and require 
different marketing strategies. Perishability influences marketing 
channels. Many food products require special handling, even after 
processing, and must be brought to market much more quickly than, 
say, furniture or clothing. The relationship between the production 
process and the acceptability of the final product is another 
consideration. Some products can be made equally well by craft or 
factory methods, but others, especially traditional handicrafts, lose a 
significant portion of their market when they are machine made. The 
list of considerations could be extended almost indefinitely. The point 
to be emphasised is that the nature of a cluster's products has a direct 
bearing on whether a cluster is likely to industrialise and, if it can, how 
the industrialisation process needs to proceed. 
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Market size, both the number of participants and their geographic 
spread, is also critical to cluster development and the larger process of 
industrialisation of which it is a part. Schmitz (1997: 11-12) 
underscores this point when he states that 'clustering can give rise to 
successive layers of specialisation provided that the overall scale of 
demand grows' (emphasis in original). The simplest conceptualisation 
of market size is that it is defined by the size of the local population 
and the level of their purchasing power. By this measure, markets in 
Africa are small and access to foreign markets difficult. Small national 
populations, low incomes, poor infrastructure, and movement 
restrictions left over from colonial times are among the reasons for 
small domestic markets. Weak distribution systems help to keep 
markets small and segmented in many African countries (Pedersen 
1997). The lack of a large well-functioning wholesale trade system, or 
where such systems exist, their bias towards the products of large 
industry forces many small producers to sell their products retail or 
cany them to distant markets themselves. 
The problem of small domestic markets is one that has to be faced 
squarely by individual enterprises and enterprise clusters, but it is not 
insurmountable. Two broad strategies are available: firms can extend 
their market geographically, or they can attempt to capitalise on the 
smallness of the markets they face. The first option may involve 
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expanding within (lie domestic market or entering foreign markets. The 
choice will depend on a number of factors, including the nature of the 
p. oduct; but generally speaking, broadening domestic market coverage 
is easier for most small-firm clusters than exporting. 
Barriers to entry into foreign markets include problems with the 
products themselves (poor quality, poor packaging, etc.), and 
environmental factors such as poor infrastructiue for exporting 
(especially problematic for perishable goods), lack of information 
flow, and red tape and corruption. Despite these difficulties, African 
industry can be competitive in some areas. The Regional Programme 
for Economic Development identified export opportunities for 
garments and home products in both die US and European markets 
(Biggs etal. 1994, 1996). One of the case studies reported in this paper 
documents the export challenges and opportunities faced by the 
Kenyan fish processing industry. 
Efficient small firms have another option open to them. They can 
attempt to capitalise on the small domestic market. Dawson (1992: 35, 
37) argues that the small size of most domestic markets in Africa can 
actually be a boon to small enterprises. Where markets are small and 
relatively specialised, producers who can manufacture small batches 
efficiently can out-compete large firms. 
11 
ids Dp 110. 295 
2.3.2 Available economies of scale and scope 
The size of output is clearly related to market size. The entrepreneur 
who can reach a larger market can produce more, and can often gain 
more than proportionately from the increased output. This is the result 
of what economists call 'increasing returns'. The most familiar form 
of increasing return arises from scale economies, but at least as 
important, especially in situations where the market for any given 
product is likely to be small, are economies of scope. 
Increasing returns arise when an increase in all inputs leads to a 
more-than-proportional increase in output. Even when a firm is able to 
produce more efficiently at higher levels, scale economies may not 
actually be available. Available economies of scale are related not 
only to market size, but also to investment in machinery and the 
opportunities for division of labour in production. At the level of 
production and investment, it appears that scale economies could be 
available to African enterprise in many subsectors. African firms 
typically operate at suboptimal size, even compared with those in other 
developing countries (see Table 2.1). Although some of the differences 
in average plant size between industrialised and developing countries 
may be due to factors such as the use of different technologies, many 
African firms, including those in most of the clusters discussed below, 
appear to operate at an uneconomically small scale (Pryor 1972, Cortes 
12 
etal. 1987: 21-27) 
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Table 2.1: Average plant sizes, selected industries 
High-income countries Middle and low-income 
countries 
Industry N Average size 
(no. of workers) 
N Average size 
(no. of workers) 
Fabr ica ted 9 38.3 9 15.4 
metal 
Apparel 9 43.0 14 13.4 
Furniture 7 55.4 13 4.4 
Source: Cortes etal. 1987: 222-23 
Although the general distinction between craft and factoiy production 
is useful to bear in mind, it is also important to recognise that in 
practice the two can be mixed. Sverrisson (1992: 105) speaks of 
mechanisation being inserted bit by bit into the prevailing craft mode 
of production. First one process is mechanised, then another. At any 
given moment, the use of specialised machines is likely to be 
combined with the continuance of unspecialised labour. The result is 
a production process in which each artisan works on his own piece, 
using whatever machinery is available, but without collaboration with 
other workers, from the beginning until the item is finished. One of the 
major challenges faced by entrepreneurs as their firms grow is 
changing from craft to factory production methods. Clusters can ease 
this shift in the productive process by permitting the division of labour 
14 
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to occur on a firm-by-firm basis, rather than within a single enterprise. 
Economies of scope are present when it is more efficient to operate 
two or more activities in tandem than in isolation (Coase 1937; Stoiper 
and Walker 1989: 130-31). Several types of economies of scope are 
available to small enterprises and, by extension, to enterprise clusters. 
The most common may be situations of concurrent scale economies, 
where the processes involved in producing two or more products reach 
their least cost output at roughly the same level. Thus the producer of 
cooking pots may diversify into related metal products and achieve 
economies of scope, even when the size of the market for any one of 
these products may not allow scale economies to be realised. 
Coordinative scale economies are available when integration of 
labour processes and regulation of material flows benefit overall 
production efficiency. A good example is the food processor who 
varies her products according to the growing seasons in order to keep 
her machinery operating fully throughout the year. Another, which 
emerges in one of the South African case studies, is the savings 
realised from marketing a line of products jointly. Economies of scope 
are also available from the sharing of technical know-how and 
working skills from one process or product to another. The furniture 
makers who expand into making wooden crates and construction goods 
are an example of this type of economy of scope. 
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2.3.3 Institutions governing exchange relations 
That institutions are important to development in general and 
industrialisation in particular is now generally accepted. A full 
treatment of the economic and social institutions governing the 
exchange of goods and services would take us far beyond the 
boundaries of this paper. Nevertheless, it is important to draw attention 
to two inter-related issues that arise in several of the cases that follow. 
The first is trust. Economic exchange will not normally take place 
without a certain measure of trust between the parties. Trust involves 
shared expectations of the outcome of a transaction. Humphrey and 
Schmitz (1996) define trust in terms of agents' belief that the other 
party, given the chance to act opportunistically, will not do so. Zucker 
(1986) distinguishes three different bases for trust: (1) process-based, 
where trust is tied to past or expected exchange, such as in reputation 
or gift-exchange; (2) characteristic-based, where trust is tied to the 
personal characteristics of the other party; and (3) institutionally-
based, where trust is tied to institutional certification or enforcement. 
The first two types, according to Zucker, need to be replaced by 
institutionally-based trust when societies become larger, more socially 
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heterogeneous, and more geographically dispersed. 
The second issue, clearly related to the first, is contract enforcement. 
Much institutionally-based trust depends on the existence of a third 
party, prepared and able to enforce contacts and prevent opportunistic 
behaviour (Zucker 1986, North 1990). In Africa, however, such 
institutions often are either missing or seem unable to function. 
Survey results from Ghana suggest that enforcement of commercial 
contacts is problematic for two reasons (Fafchamps 1996). First, there 
is no mechanism by which information about defaulters is widely 
shared among firms, and second, the risks and uncertainties under 
which films operate cause many of them to default on contracts at least 
occasionally. Finns have little faith in the legal system as a means of 
ensuring that customers or suppliers fulfill their contracts or 
compensate them for breach of contract. Kimuyu (1997) found that 
one-third or less of Kenyan manufacturers would take a supplier or 
customer to court, and that the proportion of micro and small 
enterprises using the courts to settle disputes is even smaller. Finns 
tend to insist that customers pay cash, granting credit only to the most 
trustworthy. They protect themselves against problems with suppliers 
by inspecting goods before making payment, instead of taking them on 
faith and negotiating afterwards if quality is deficient. 
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2.4 External Economies 
Passive collective efficiency is essentially reaping the benefits of 
external economies. External economies exist when social benefits are 
higher than private benefits. External economies are the unintended or 
incidental by-products of economic action. Krugman (1991), following 
Marshall (1890), identifies three main types of external economies in 
enterprise clusters: labour-market pooling, development of specialised 
local suppliers and services, and technological spillovers. To these 
must be added the most basic of agglomeration economies: market 
access. 
Market access is the first and, as we will see, most universal external 
economy for clustered firms. The grouping of producers in close 
geographic proximity facilitates the meeting of buyers and sellers. By 
attracting buyers both from the immediate vicinity and more distant 
places, it improves access to the overall market for a firm's products 
or services. Thus, once a cluster is established, market access is one of 
the potential benefits of locating within its bounds. 
Sectoral and geographical concentration of productive activities 
tends to create a pool of specialised skills that benefits both workers 
and firms. Such pools of industry-specific skills are evident in many 
developing country clusters (Nadvi and Schmitz 1994: 41). Whether 
they are also present in African clusters is a matter for investigation. 
1 8 
ids Dp 110. 295 
Clustering of firms also gives rise to specialised suppliers of inputs 
and services. The concentration of producer firms with similar supply 
needs attracts suppliers offering raw materials or components, new or 
second-hand machinery, and spare pails (Nadvi and Schmitz 1994: 
13-14). Clustering seems to ease supply constraints, often found to 
hold back small-scale industiy in Africa. 
Finally, clustering facilitates the diffusion of technological know-
how and ideas. It does this by permitting the rapid flow of technical 
information between producers operating near one another, and also by 
enhancing information flow between traders, producers, suppliers, and 
others connected to the cluster (Nadvi and Schmitz 1994: 18). Given 
that one of the major characteristics of developing countries is their 
weak technological base, technological spillovers within a cluster 
could well be particularly important. 
There is, however, a downside of external economies. According to 
mainstream economics, the lack of match between social and private 
returns represents a market failure that affects investment. Specifically, 
external economies can lead to under-investment because of the lack 
of adequate reward for that investment. If this is tme, then these 
disabling external economies may be a factor in the failure to grow of 
many African clusters. 
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2.5 Joint Action 
Schmitz (1997) contends that local external economies are necessary 
for the development of a strong cluster, but that they are not sufficient. 
What he terms 'consciously pursued joint action' must also be present 
for industrial clusters to flourish. 
Figure 2.1: Forms of joint action in clusters 
Dimension Bilateral Multilateral 
Horizontal Two cooperators at the 
same level in the 
production chain, e.g. 
sharing equipment 
More than two cooperators at 
the same level in the production 
chain, e.g. a sectoral association 
Vertical Two cooperators at 
different levels of the 
production chain, e.g. a 
producer and user 
improving components 
More than two cooperators at 
different levels of the 
production chain, e.g. an 
association or alliance 
composed of manufacturers and 
distributors of a product 
Source: Adapted from Schmitz (1997) 
This emphasis on the 'joint action' aspects of collective efficiency 
underscores the importance of inter-firm linkages and networks. 4 One 
can identify four categories of joint action in clusters, based on two 
dimensions. The first dimension has to do with the number of 
cooperators; the second, with the direction of cooperation. 5 Thus joint 
20 
ids Dp 110. 295 
action may be bilateral or multilateral. In bilateral cooperation, two 
firms work together as, for example, when they share an expensive 
piece of equipment. In multilateral action, groups of firms join 
together, often in an association or other organisation, for some 
common purpose. Joint action may also be vertical or horizontal. 
Vertical cooperation happens when firms involved in different stages 
of the production-distribution chain work together. Horizontal joint 
action refers to collaboration between/among competitors. The four 
types of joint action can be viewed schematically in Figure 2.1. 
Active cultivation of such firm linkages and entrepreneurial 
networks apparently contributes to the growth of enterprises (Ban-
1995, Alila and McCormick 1997). Whether the active aspects of 
collective efficiency are a necessary ingredient for cluster success 
remains to be seen. It is also important to recognise that joint action 
has its costs. The opportunity costs of associational activity are 
probably the most obvious example. When businesses are very small, 
and joint action must be undertaken by the entrepreneur, he/she must 
carefully weigh the use of scarce time for attendance at meetings or 
other activities that do not bring immediate benefit. Joint action may 
also have political costs, especially in situations where the authorities 
frown upon grassroots initiatives. 
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2.6 Clusters and Industrialisation: An Analytical Framework 
The discussion thus far suggests that clustering has the potential to 
facilitate the industrialisation both within the cluster and beyond it, but 
that such potential is not always realised. We know that many clusters 
get stuck at low levels of production and distribution. A clearer 
understanding not only of clusters that have industrialised, but also of 
those that remain essentially small-enterprise agglomerations should 
provide insights into steps that business associations, governments, 
and other interested parties might take to further the process of 
Africa's industrialisation. 
Preliminary analysis suggests that African clusters fall broadly into 
three groups (McConnick 1998). The first group makes its 
contribution by building a productive environment tliat, in some 
respects at least, prepares the ground for industrialisation. The second 
group of clusters already has much clearer signs of emerging collective 
efficiency. These clusters are already industrialising, but remain 
limited by the weak technology of most of the firms and the frequent 
sidetracking of associational activity. The third group of clusters 
includes large as well as small and medium-size firms. They aim for 
wider markets, national and/or foreign, and are generally able to 
produce competitively. These clusters fall squarely within the 
industrialisation process, though serious challenges remain. 
2 2 
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Within each group, we examine each cluster's economic context and 
its internal operations. The contextual variables are three: the nature 
and size of the product market, the actual or potential economies of 
scale and scope, and the institutions governing exchange. Within the 
cluster, the analysis considers both external economies and joint 
action. A brief treatment of the general history and specific turning-
points of each cluster provides both additional contextual material and 
a sense of cluster dynamics. 
Saying that existing clusters are at different levels of development 
does not imply a 'stages of growth' model of development (see 
Rostow 1960). For one thing, as will be clear from the histories of the 
clusters described in this paper, the origins and growth paths of 
clusters vaiy greatly. By no means do all begin at the first level, nor do 
they proceed through a uniform set of stages. The levels described 
above are rough guides to the relative development of this particular 
set of clusters. They are useful because they help to explain clusters' 
differing needs, and perhaps more importantly, they demonstrate the 
multiformity of the links between enterprise clusters and the 
industrialisation process. 
3 LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR INDUSTRIALISATION 
The successful Latin American and Asian clusters look veiy different 
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from the African cluster studied to date. The footwear cluster in the 
Sinos valley of Brazil boasted more than 1,800 firms with an average 
employment of over 80 persons each in 1991, causing Sclimitz (1993) 
to name it a 'supercluster'. The firms included shoe manufacturers, 
subcontractors producing parts of shoes, producers of inputs, export 
and forwarding agents, and other related activities. Exports of shoes 
produced in the Sinos valley were valued at nearly US$1.2 billion in 
1991. Another cluster, in Sialkot, Pakistan, produces stainless steel 
medical, dental and surgical instruments for markets in North America 
and Western Europe (Nadvi 1997). The Sialkot cluster consists of 
300-350 manufacturing firms, up to 1,500 task-specific subcontracting 
units, and a variety of suppliers and service providers. Sialkot firms 
average approximately 20 workers each. Tlie cluster supplies roughly 
half the global market for disposable 'floor' instruments, and around 
10-15 per cent of world production of high quality 'operation theatre' 
instruments. 
In contrast, most African clusters are hardly more than basic sectoral 
agglomerations consisting of hundreds, or sometimes thousands, of 
tiny firms, that operate at much lower levels of technology. They have 
few linkages within or outside the cluster, and their capacity for joint 
action is weak. This section examines three small-enterprise clusters, 
all in Kenya, all at a low level of development. The subsequent two 
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sections focus on more advanced clusters in several African countries. 
All three sections address the questions posed in the introduction: do 
the clusters have the characteristics associated with successful 
industrial districts elsewhere? To what extent have they been able to 
respond to opportunities and shocks in their environment? And, how 
closely are these clusters linked to the wider industrialisation process 
in their countries? 
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3.1 Garment Production, Nairobi 
Nairobi has two large garment-making clusters, boused in city council 
markets on the eastern side of the city. Most of the firms in the two 
markets are 'mini-manufacturers', i.e. small firms with limited 
division of labour (McCormick et al. 1997). In addition to 
approximately 600 producers, the markets support traders in inputs and 
finished products, machine repairers, scissors sharpeners, transporters, 
and food kiosks. Although there are no formal financial institutions 
within the clusters, several NGOs offer credit to businesses in the 
markets. 
3.1.1 History and turning-points of the Nairobi garment markets 
Uhuru and Quarry Road markets were built in 1974 to replace older 
makeshift premises dating from colonial times. Quarry Road market, 
consisting of three concrete-block buildings, is in Gikomba, about two 
kilometres east of Nairobi's city centre. Uhuru market, a similar, but 
larger complex of five buildings, is a few kilometres to the south. 
Two clear turning-points can be identified. In the late 1970s 
businesses turned from retailing second-hand clothes to making new 
clothing (McCormick el al. 1994). The products sold well, both in 
Nairobi and secondary towns. The 1984 ban on imports of second-
hand clothes strengthened their position. The cluster's second turning-
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point came when this ban was lifted in 1991 (Ongile and McComiick 
1996). At that point the combination of increased competition and 
already slack demand caused by a depressed economy was a real blow 
to small-scale production. 
In 1989 Uhuru market housed 361 garment manufacturers, and 
Gikomba market, 235 (McCormick 1997). The premises, though 
clearly better than the outdoor sites of the jua kali metalworkers and 
carpenters, are unsuitable for gannent manufacturing. Lighting is poor, 
electricity supply erratic, and business services lacking. The semi-open 
stalls are too cramped to allow for efficient flow of work and lack the 
privacy needed for new product development (McCormick el al. 
1997). 
3.1.2 Economic context for the clothing production 
Kenyan gannent producers face complex markets. A few large-scale 
producers have managed to break into the export market (McCormick 
1992, Biggs el al. 1994, 1996). Domestic markets can be roughly 
divided into the markets for general men's, women's, and children's 
wear and specialised markets such as those for uniforms, overalls, 
wedding dresses, etc. Each market segment can be further divided 
according to product price and quality. 
The domestic market for new clothes is constrained by the poverty 
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and declining purchasing power of most Kenyans, (he local nature of 
distribution systems, and the availability of cheap alternatives. 
Average real wages declined by 57% in the private sector and 49% in 
the public sector between 1988 and 1994 (Kenya, 1995c and 1992a). 
Unlike Zimbabwe and South Africa, Kenya does not have a national 
clothing distribution system (Pedersen 1993, October 1996). Large 
chains of clothing retailers do not exist, and except in Nairobi and a 
few large towns, even small retail shops are few. Tbis means that 
producers must either sell to traders who travel to specific 'up-country' 
locations, or go themselves to sell their wares. Naturally, this limits the 
size of the market that gannent manufacturers can access. The market 
is further limited by the availability of cheap alternatives to new 
clothing. For poor consumers and, increasingly for those in (he 
middle-income range, second-hand clothes compete with new ones for 
the family clothing budget (Ongile and McCormick 1996). 
Economies of scale and scope are theoretically available, but may be 
difficult for these producers to realise. The mini-manufacturers 
averaged only 3.5 workers per turn compared with a developing 
country average of 13.4 workers in apparel firms (see Table 2.1 
above). Their total factor productivity (TFP) was also lower than any 
other group of gannent producers in Nairobi. Both of these facts 
indicate ample room for realising scale economies. Studies elsewhere 
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suggest that economies of scope may also be available in clothing 
production (October 1996, Visser 1996). 
3.1.3 External economies in the garment markets 
The main external economies for these firms are market access and, to 
a lesser degree, the availability of intermediate inputs and services. 
Neither labour-market pooling nor technological spillovers appear to 
support cluster activity. 
Market access is a major benefit to location in these clusters. The 
garment markets have become known in Nairobi as places where 
inexpensive clothing can be bought at either retail or wholesale prices. 
Particularly important, though not fully described, is the markets' 
ability to attract traders who will cany clothing to the smaller towns 
and rural areas (McConnick 1997). 
The clusters have given rise to limited trade in intermediate inputs 
and have also spawned some basic seivices. 6 Gikomba has three fabric 
sellers and six shops selling buttons, thread, and other materials. Uliuru 
has ten fabric retailers in the open-air market outside the main market, 
but clothing producers claim that prices are so high that they are forced 
to go to wholesale and retail shops in the centre ofNairobi. There are 
also mobile traders who bring cloth, scissors, buttons, and other items 
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to the markets. Each market has several machine repairers, scissors 
sharpeners, and food kiosks to cater for the needs of the workers. 
Outside of each are transporters with pickup taicks and handcarts 
ready to be hired to take products to market or transport inputs from 
town. 
Economies associated with labour-market pooling and technology 
spillovers appear to be minimal. Labour is there, but entrepreneurs -
especially those involved in slightly larger enterprises - say that the 
skill levels are uneven (McConnick et al. 1997). The technology used 
is veiy basic, so there is little improved technology to spill over! 
3.1.4 Joint action among garment producers 
Finn linkages within the clusters appear to be weak. Despite the 
large concentrations of garment businesses, effective horizontal 
linkages are lacking. Some vertical linkages on both the input and 
supply sides exist, but it is not clear whether these ties lead to 
beneficial joint action. 
Horizontal bilateral linkages are confined mainly to borrowing and 
lending of basic tools, such as scissors and measuring tapes, and the 
contracting of services requiring specialised machines (McCormick 
1997: 117). One reason for the weak linkages appears to be lack of 
trust For example, entrepreneurs interviewed complained that, as soon 
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as they develop a new design, their competitors steal it. 
Horizontal multilateral linkages do not exist. Neither market has a 
site association, and there is no sectoral association of garment 
producers anywhere in Nairobi. A group of medium-sized producers 
said they were interested in forming an association, and researchers 
encouraged them by calling two meetings, but the idea was not earned 
forward (McCormick et al. 1997). 
Vertical linkages with suppliers and garment traders exist, but 
information on die content of those linkages is scanty. Most firms buy 
cloth from wholesalers located in Nairobi's city centre. Some have 
established enough of a relationship with these wholesalers to qualify 
for credit (McConnick et al. 1997). Although location in these markets 
offers access to the traders who frequent the buildings to buy finished 
goods, it is not clear whether such traders offer the producers anything 
beyond a simple market transaction. 
3.1.5 Nairobi garment producers: summary and conclusions 
Although firms in these clusters use a simple division of labour that 
puts them squarely into factory production, they have real difficulties 
in achieving economies of scale. On the one hand, they face problems 
ofmarket size caused by a weak distribution system, and on the other, 
they are constrained by problems of space and capital. Both make it 
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difficult for them to reduce units costs. 
Market access and limited intermediate input effects are positive 
externalities in the cluster, but they are not accompanied by effective 
joint action. They have no vehicle for negotiating with the Nairobi City 
Council, which owns their business premises, for improvements in 
basic amenities. Nor do they have obvious links to larger firms that 
might help in upgrading product quality or in connecting them to 
larger domestic or export markets. 
3.2 Metalwork in Kainukunji, Nairobi 
Kamukunji is a large, busy cluster of tinsmiths, where nearly two 
thousand artisans fashion a variety of metal products, including tin 
trunks, charcoal stoves, security bolts, cooking pots, griddles, bicycle 
earners, and wheelbarrows (Frijns et al. 1997; King 1996: 55-57; 
Undugu Design Unit 1995; Haan 1995; McCormick 1988). The 
cluster's location between the industrial area and the country bus 
station make it accessible to both supply and product markets. 
Most firms use craft-based production methods and very simple 
technology (Frijns et al. 1997). Fewer than 10% have the electricity 
connections that are essential to higher technology production. The 
majority use hand tools or simple hand-operated machines to make 
products of new and/or used sheet metal. Production processes are 
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slow and products poor in quality. Workshops with electricity 
undertake welding, engineering, and fabrication work, frequently 
making to order rather than for the market. Their products include door 
and window grills, metal brackets, hinges, door bolts and latches, 
bicycle parts and simple machines. 
3.2.1 History and turning-points of the Kamukunji Jua Kali 
Artisans working in Grogan, an area close to Nairobi's city centre, 
were displaced to make way for a housing estate in 1978.7 Most of the 
vehicle repairers moved to Ziwani (see Kinyanjui 1997) while other 
types of businesses relocated to Eastleigh and city council land at 
Kamukunji . Still others came to the Kamukunji site from nearby 
Burma market.8 The local metalworkers were joined by otiters who 
migrated to the area from other parts of the country to set up their 
businesses on the open land. In 1985 the council gave them 24 hours 
to vacate the area, but the district commissioner restrained the council 
and allocated the land to the artisans temporarily. Later that same year, 
President Moi visited the artisans and announced that sheds would be 
built and the land given to the artisans. The president also instructed 
the artisans to organise themselves into an association so that the 
government could better assist them. 
This was a turning-point, partly because the sheds provided at least 
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a few businesses with much needed shelter from the siui and rain, but 
more importantly because of the new legitimacy the presidential 
decree afforded the entire open-air small-manufacturing sector. 
Unfortunately, this support, which was to be further developed in 
policy documents, was not well translated into practice (Kenya 1986, 
1988, 1992b, 1996; Macharia 1993; McCormick 1996; King 1996). 
3.2.2 Economic context for jua kali metalwork 
Kamukunji caters for a large low-income consumer market in Nairobi 
and up-country towns, and also supplies certain products, such as 
wheelbarrows and farm implements, to agriculture and industry. 
Although there has been no systematic investigation of the distribution 
system for metal products of the type produced at Kamukunji, it 
appears that clients are both wholesalers who will often buy similar 
products from several producers, and individuals (Frijns et al. 1997). 
Most Kamukunji products are of low quality with few variations. The 
demand for such items is slowly decreasing as consumers gain access 
to higher standard goods from supermarkets and retail shops (Undugu 
Design Unit 1995). Thus, although the potential market continues to 
grow with Kenya's increasing population, the size of the market 
currently served may be shrinking. 
Kamukunji has the potential for realising scale economies. 
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Fabricated metal workshops in middle- and low-income countries 
average 15.4 workers (see Table 2.1), suggesting that the one- and 
two-person establishments in Kamukunji are probably economically 
inefficient. Realising economies of scale would, however, mean 
changing the organisation of production from its present craft form to 
one using some division of labour. This would, in turn, require 
standardising parts to a degree that is difficult to achieve with hand 
tools. 
Economies of scope, especially managerial economies and 
concurrent scale economies, should be available to these businesses. 
Realising such economies of scope will also entail changing the 
prevailing form of production. 
Contract enforcement is problematic in Kenya for reasons similar to 
those identified by Fafchamps (1996) for Ghana. Artisans will, 
therefore, generally prefer to deal with persons they already know 
rather dian with those who might not only default, but also disappear. 
3.2.3 External economies in Kamukunji 
The most positive external economy for Kamukunji 's producers is the 
cluster's effect on firms' access to product markets. The concentration 
of metalworkers in Kamukunji is well known in Nairobi and beyond, 
so it no doubt serves as a magnet for customers. The way the artisans 
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display their wares suggests that they are conscious of the marketing 
role of the cluster. The association is active in promoting members' 
attendance at trade shows, jua kali exhibitions, and provincial 
agricultural shows (Hart 1994: 4). The association also attempts to 
offer assistance to members in locating new local marketing channels 
and is trying to establish a working relationship with the Kenya 
National Chamber of Commerce so that the Chamber can assist with 
exports to other African countries. 
Both private businesses and the association have attempted, with 
vaiying degrees of success, to bring intermediate inputs to Kamukunji. 
Frijns et al. (1997: 98) report that there are three hardware shops 
operating in Kamukunji that provide nails, wires, metal strips, and 
other metal products. The association tried a system of consolidated 
purchasing of raw materials from the large companies (Hart 1994). 
They sold them to the artisans with no mark-up, thus giving their 
members a significant cost break. The effort broke down, however, 
because the middlemen who had been supplying the artisans 
complained to the big companies that their business was being eroded. 
As a result it became more difficult for the association to make direct 
purchases from the companies. In mid-1994, when Hart's research 
was being earned out, the association was looking for other 
alternatives for obtaining raw materials. 
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Technological spillovers are minimal and confined to a small group 
of more sophisticated producers. The oldest artisans in Kamukunji 
were trained by their Asian predecessors in the 1940s and 1950s.9 
Most appear to use the same skills and techniques learned then, despite 
some efforts on the part of the association, the Ministry of Research, 
Technical Training, and Technology (MRTTT), and the Kenya 
Association of Manufacturers to provide seminars and exposure visits 
to local industry (Hart 1994). In general, Kamukunji exhibits little 
technological development. If anything, there seems to be a dampening 
effect of low-level technology that reduces firms' ability to realise 
economies of scale. 
One exception has been the development of wheelbarrow 
production.10 Wheelbarrow making started at Kamukunji in 1984 
when artisans copied a wheelbarrow that they purchased from a 
Nairobi shop, and then modified the design to make it stronger and 
easier to produce. At present about 12 different workshops make 
wheelbarrows at Kamukunji. All use the 1984 design to produce the 
wheelbarrow in three different sizes. They purchase the main materials 
(iron sheet, pipe, fiats) and weld the final product together. There is no 
job specialisation among the wheelbarrow makers. Each group makes 
the product from beginning to end. The workshops attempt to 
standardise parts for their own wheelbarrows, but there is no 
41 
ids Dp no. 295 
standardisation across producers. Nor, apparently, lias anyone tried to 
improve the design that is now 14 years old. 
Labour-market pooling, in a situation of very low skill requirements, 
should result in low labour costs. Most Kamukunji linns, however, 
have 110 employees so this potential benefit is not realised. 
Furthermore, the training system, when combined with very low 
barriers to entry in metal fabrication (see McCormick 1988: 55), 
appears to encourage the multiplication of tiny firms. 
3.2.4 Joint action in Kamukunji 
Joint action in Kamukunji emanates from three different sets of inter-
firai linkages. At the broadest multilateral level is the Kamukunji 
Association which, in theory at least, includes all artisans working in 
Kamukunji. Next are informal groupings of firms making similar 
products. Finally there are the usual bilateral exchanges of tools and 
equipment, and occasional subcontracting arrangements. 
Associational activity among Nairobi's metalworkers has a long 
history. Artisans had an organisation that was stopped by the colonial 
government during the 'Emergency' of the 1950s.11 After that, 
groupings were informal until early 1986 when the first self-help 
groups were formed in response to the president's call. The ministry 
(MRTTT) encouraged the formation of such jua kali associations 
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throughout the country, and of their grouping into national 
'associations of associations'. This allowed the government to channel 
all assistance to the artisans through the National Federation of Jua 
Kali and local associations (Kamukunji 1994; Macharia 1993: 24 ff). 
The umbrella association took an active role in policy dialogue, the 
allocation of plots to jua kali producers, and organising the annual jua 
kali trade fair until it became embroiled in a political dispute that led 
to its dissolution in 1994 (Haan 1995, Kinyanjui 1998). 
The present Kamukunji Jua Kali Association was formed in 1993. 
The MRTTT at that time requested the self-help group to become an 
association (Kamukunji 1994). By 1994, the association had 
approximately 850 members, considerably more than the maximum of 
270 recorded by its predecessor self-help group (Hart 1994). In 
addition to serving as a conduit for funds, and carrying out the supply 
and marketing activities described above, the association aimed to 
improve artisans' working conditions and provide them with access to 
technical training (Kamukunji 1994). The association also provided 
services such as security - very important given lack of lockable 
buildings - and through its women's group recycled leftover scrap 
metal (King 1996; Frijns et al. 1997). However, it has not had notable 
success in upgrading Kamukunji 's infrastructure or general working 
environment, nor does it appear to have succeeded in improving 
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technology. 
The second type of multilateral inter-firm cooperation is the informal 
grouping of similar businesses. One striking example, already 
mentioned, is the group of twelve firms engaged in manufacturing 
wheelbarrows. These, according to our informant, are now joining 
together to market their product, targeting especially supermarkets that 
have hardware departments. They have not yet, however, tackled the 
difficult issue of standardisation of parts across the group members. 
Furthermore, it is not clear whether this group is unique, or if similar 
informal groups exist in Kamukunji. 
3.2.5 Summary and conclusions on Kamukunji cluster 
In sum, then, Kamukunji is a large petty commodity cluster which is 
realising only a few of the potential benefits of clustering. The cluster 
is well known and therefore provides access to local and national 
markets. Some suppliers are located within the cluster, though it is not 
clear whether these have migrated in or are the result of specialisation 
among existing firms. There appear to be few technological spillovers. 
Even where they exist, as in the case of the wheelbarrow producers, 
problems such as standardisation have yet to be tackled. 
Economies of scale are not being realised as producers continue to 
operate at uneconomically small sizes. Kamukunji has a large pool of 
44 
ids Dp 110. 295 
labour available, but it appears that most start their own firms rather 
than join existing enterprises. Vertical joint action is entirely missing. 
Horizontal joint action is present in varying degrees. At its broadest is 
the Kamukunji Jua Kali Association. The association suffers from 
some of the problems of groups initiated ' f rom above' (Haan 1995). 
It seems to have been more successful in achieving the aim articulated 
by (lie Provincial Technical Training Officer (i.e., bringing the artisans 
together so they can be reached by government initiatives) than in 
meeting its own objectives. In particular, the association has been 
thwarted in its attempt to undertake joint buying of raw materials and 
has been able to do very little to uplift the overall standard of the 
working environment at Kamukunji. The effort of the wheelbarrow 
producers to market their products together is a promising example of 
horizontal joint action on a smaller scale. 
3.3 Vehicle repair in the Thika (Kenya) Jua Kali 
The jua kali cluster in the Kigandaini ward of Thika, a town of 
approximately 72,000 people, 46 kilometres northeast of Nairobi, 
houses over 300 enterprises involved in a variety of activities. 
Research carried out in 1996-97 investigated motor vehicle repair and 
related manufacturing and trading activities in the cluster (McCormick 
et al. 1996; Kinyanjui 1996, 1997, 1998, McCormick 1998). About 
one-third (36%) of the enterprises actually repair vehicles, an 
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additional 8% sell spare parts, and 5% are involved in the manufacture 
of spares. The remaining enterprises manufacture furniture, various 
metal products, stove and lantern wicks, mops, cushions, mattresses, 
or are involved in the retailing of scrap metal and food. 
All types of vehicles are repaired in Thika, but malatus and heavy 
commercial vehicles appear to dominate.12 Only half (50%) of the 
repair firms say they repair private saloon cars. The vehicles are most 
commonly between four and ten years old, though many firms said that 
they often repair vehicles in the 11-15 year age range. Newer vehicles 
are more likely to be taken to the larger garages (Kinyanjui 1998). For 
some, this is because they are under warranty or, in the case of 
accident-related repairs, they are comprehensively insured. In other 
cases, the owners, who are likely to be more affluent than average, 
may prefer (and be willing to pay a premium for) the amenities of a 
formal garage. 
3.3.1 History and turning-points of Thika Jua Kali 
In 1988 the Thika Municipal Council required jua kali operators to 
move out of the town's main market. The council chose Kigandaini, 
an area that had been set aside for a fire brigade, as the new jua kali 
site, and enterprises began to locate there soon afterwards. Just over 
half of the present entrepreneurs had established themselves in the 
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cluster by the end of 1990. The majority (59%) were new enterprises, 
while the rest (41%) were existing businesses moved from elsewhere 
in Thika town or other pails of the country. 
The site, as it was received from the municipality, had no amenities. 
In the early 1990s, a delegation from the Belgian government visited 
the cluster and promised to assist with site upgrading. The association 
and the Ministry of Research, Technical Training and Technology 
entered into intensive negotiations. After many delays, construction of 
some 66 permanent workshops finally began in early 1997. To permit 
the building to take place, many businesses had to move to temporary 
quarters outside the main site. The building process has been on-again-
off-again, apparently because of delayed payments to the contractor. 
As of February 1998, the workshops remain roofless. An association 
official estimates the amount spent to date to be in the vicinity of 
K.shs. 27 million, which, in his opinion, is far too much for the quality 
of the construction. 
Since Kigandaini is a veiy young cluster, the notion of turning-points 
has limited validity. Nevertheless, the major turning-point thus far 
came with the liberalisation of Kenya's import markets. Market 
liberalisation has increased the quantity and variety of both vehicles 
and spare pails. As far back as the 1960s, Kenya had imported second-
hand vehicles, but their importation was stopped in order to promote 
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local assembly of new vehicles. Then, from the mid-1980s, the 
government once again allowed imports. The first entrants were fully 
reconditioned vehicles from Japan that required little maintenance, at 
least initially. Then, with the general liberalisation of markets, the 
range of imported vehicles was extended to include what have come 
to be known as the Dubai cars. These second-hand vehicles enter 
Kenya through the free port of Dubai. Since they are not reconditioned, 
many quickly develop problems requiring the attention of mechanics 
such as those in the Thika Jua Kali. Nearly all (97.6%) of the firms 
reported that the repair business had increased as a result of 
liberalisation. 
Liberalisation has also increased the availability and reduced the 
prices of the spare pails that are the vehicle repairers' main raw 
materials. There was general agreement (100% of those responding to 
the questions) that spares had been both more easily available and 
cheap since liberalisation. On the subject of quality, however, opinions 
were mixed. Most (72.4%) felt that the quality of available spares had 
remained the same; the rest (27.6%) thought quality had deteriorated. 
3.3.2 Economic context for vehicle repair in Thika 
The market for vehicle repair in Kenya is highly competitive, and is 
shared by at least three different types of enterprises. Large, formal 
garages, mostly associated with tire major vehicle assemblers, cater for 
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new vehicles under warranty and serve the high end of the repair 
market. These garages offer diagnostic services, provide their own 
s ra re parts, sometimes offer replacement vehicles, and usually 
guarantee their work. Mediiun-scale garages, either free-standing or 
run in connection with a petrol station, service a wide range of private 
and commercial vehicles. Some are general garages, offering most 
seivices, while others specialise in particular repair types. Most slock 
spares, but also permit customers to purchase spares elsewhere. The 
final group consists of individual mechanics and the jua kali 
enterprises, both of which tend to specialise in a single aspect of 
repair, and to service older vehicles. 
The size of the market is a function of the number of vehicles on the 
road and their age and/or condition. The market for vehicle repair also 
has some geographic boundaries, though reputation, as we will see in 
the case of Suame, is capable of widening a cluster's market reach. 
Thika town and its immediate environs probably have between 1,500 
and 3,000 vehicles in all (McCormick 1998).This fairly small market 
is shared by all the types of vehicle repairers named above, including 
approximately 100 jua kali enterprises in the cluster. Vehicle owners, 
especially those travelling regularly between Thika and Nairobi, may 
also choose to have their vehicles serviced in Nairobi. 
The potential for economies of scale and scope in vehicle repair, as 
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in other activities, depends on the nature of the work to be done. 
Vehicle repair is essentially custom production, with each job having 
its own character and specifications. Variations in required skills and 
in the equipment necessary to undertake different repairs encourage 
specialisation, especially for smaller firms. Certain types of repair are 
highly capital and/or skill intensive, making it difficult to realise 
economies of scale, especially for a full-service shop. Inevitably in the 
full-service garage, some types of specialised equipment will lie idle 
much of the time. In Africa, where capital is veiy expensive, firms -
especially small ones - cannot afford to invest in machinery that is not 
fully utilised. Only the largest garages maintain all specialisations in 
house. Among smaller firms, vehicle repair is characterised by 
specialised firms that interlink in a network of subcontracting 
(Kinyanjui 1996, Burrows 1992). 
Thika's vehicle repair firms are so tiny that there is probably ample 
room for developing scale economies within the subcontracting system 
(see Table 3.1). The fact that some firms are running several activities 
in tandem suggests the availability of economies of scope. For 
example, it is not uncommon for an artisan to undertake wiring repairs, 
gas welding and electrical welding. Even though these are technically 
different specialisations, the need for them occurs often enough in the 
same vehicle to make the combination a useful one. 
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The subcontracting system involves complex market and social 
factors (Kinyanjui 1997). Economic considerations dictate that 
rub contracting will take place, but trust mediates the choice of 
subcontractors (Kinyanjui 1998). When subcontracted firms fail to live 
up to their agreement, the contractor can insist that the offending firm 
redo the work, or he can deduct something from the final payment. In 
extreme cases he can sever the subcontracting relationship altogether. 
Since all of these sanctions involve time and threaten social relations 
in a close working environment, entrepreneurs would naturally prefer 
to do business with firms whose work and honesty they trust. This 
position is no doubt reinforced by the fact that neither the main 
contractor nor the subcontractor can count on the legal system or other 
institutions to support their claims, even when the claims are obviously 
valid. 
3.3.3 External economies in Thika Jua Kali 
Like most small-enterprise clusters, the Thika Jua Kali attracts 
customers who know they can find many firms ready and willing to 
perform the service(s) they need. Market access is probably the most 
positive form of external economy available to firms in this cluster. 
Over one-third (35.6%) of the entrepreneurs listed 'availability of 
customers' as the main advantage of their location. 
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Thika is drawing an increasing number of trainees and the labour-
market pooling is not always helpful. The data 011 new startups in the 
cluster support the contention that Thika's labour-market pooling is 
leading to the formation of many new microenterprises in direct 
competition with existing firms. Over one-third (39.6%) of the firms 
were begun in 1991 or later. This seems a veiy high proportion, even 
given the fact that the Thika cluster as a whole is relatively new. 
Inputs, especially spare parts, are increasingly available within the 
cluster. Approximately 15 firms manufacture simple spare parts such 
as springs, washers and plastic bushes (Kinyanjui 1996). Others, such 
as the cushion makers, are ready to produce items to order. Still others 
trade in imported and locally made spares. These spares shops 
increasingly include in their stock the pails made by the cluster's 
manufacturers. One dealer said that, when he first came to the cluster, 
he bought all of his spare parts from Nairobi. Now he buys batteiy 
latches, springs, and rubber bushes from the Kigandaini manufacturers, 
and is optimistic that, as the quality of spares made in the cluster 
improves, his stock will include more local goods (Kinyanjui 1998). 
The technology in the Thika cluster largely depends on the skills of 
those already there, most of whom were informally trained (Kinyanjui 
1997). The process for skills upgrading is also largely non-formal, 
consisting of observation and conversations with those who have a 
52 
ids Dp 110. 295 
needed skill. As Kinyanjui (1997: 41) points out, 'There is a tendency 
of passing on bad practices.' Thus technology spillovers do occur, but 
the present system does not provide a mechanism for raising the level 
of what is shared. Unless this can be changed, technology spillovers, 
like labour-market pooling, are likely to be disabling. 
3.3.4 Joint action among Thika's jua kali vehicle repairers 
Joint action in the Thika Jua Kali is horizontal. Both bilateral and 
multilateral linkages have led to effective action. Despite the presence 
of manufacturers in the cluster, the only vertical interactions seem to 
be market-based. Finns manufacturing spare pails sell them to the 
spares shops, which, in turn, sell them to repairers and their customers. 
There is no evidence that this process includes any other type of inter-
firm cooperation or leaming-by-interaction. 
The subcontracting system is at the heart of Thika's bilateral joint 
action. Repairers have production linkages with each other, and they 
recognise that being in the cluster facilitates cooperation. A large 
group (42.2%) of respondents identified these linkages as the main 
benefit of the cluster, saying that their work 'is not done in isolation', 
that their work 'depends on other repairers', or that 'they cooperate 
with other repairers' (McConnick 1998). Since (inns tend to keep their 
subcontracting partners for some time, these relationships could form 
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the basis for joint action in other areas of mutual concern (Kinyanjui 
1998). Whether such joint action actually occurs, however, is not clear. 
Other common forms of horizontal linkages are unlikely to move the 
cluster forward. Equipment sharing, for example, is limited to simple 
borrowing of spanners and wrenches; sharing of workers is occasional. 
Most of the entrepreneurs in Thika have no communication with large 
garages (Kinyanjui 1997: 41-42; 1998). 
The cluster has two associations, each with a different piupose. The 
Tliika Mariko Jua Kali Association is primarily a welfare association, 
providing benefits to members in sickness, bereavement, or other 
difficulty; while the Thika Welfare Jua Kali Association is a jua kali 
site association. The impetus for forming the site association seems to 
have been two-fold. At one level, it was simply part of the process 
mandated by the government for becoming recognised as jua kali 
operators. In this sense, the association is one of those initiated ' f rom 
above' (Haan 1995). The association also appears to have roots in 
local initiative. Some of the operators who were active in its formation 
recognised that the site chosen for them had been zoned for another 
use, and that the difficult process of relocating might have to be 
repeated if they failed to deal with the land issue. To its credit, the 
association successfully negotiated with the municipality to obtain 
ownership of the site, though association officials recognise that 
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aspects of the land tenure issue remain to be resolved (Kinyanjui 
1998). The Thika Welfare Jua Kali Association has continued to be the 
main source of horizontal multilateral joint action in the cluster. All of 
the surveyed entrepreneurs are members, and all but one (97.8%) say 
they attend meetings called by the association (McCormick 1998). 
3.3.5 Thika Jua Kali: summary and conclusions 
The cluster shows strong production linkages. Small-scale vehicle 
repair is generally characterised by extensive subcontracting, and 
Thika is no exception. In the view of the entrepreneurs themselves, 
location near those doing other types of repairs is a key benefit of the 
cluster. They recognise and value their interdependence. 
The Thika jua kali cluster is still very young. Its main problem is that 
the market for vehicle repair is fairly small. This small market and the 
disabling effects of labour-market pooling have combined to create 
very small firms that are probably not able to realise economies of 
scale. One of the greatest needs appears to be skill development. The 
present non-formal learning process in use to develop skills among 
practising vehicle repairers could be a model for skill-upgrading 
training. What appears to be needed is a way to bring new content into 
that process. 
Even though this cluster has two associations, it is vulnerable to 
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manipulation by powerful outsiders, especially government and 
donors. The situation with the workshops funded by the Belgian 
government is a case in point. Encouraged by the promise of an 
improvement in their working conditions, the association welcomed 
the Belgian initiative. Now, over a year after construction began, many 
businesses are operating in worse conditions than before while they 
wait for the promised workshops. Association officials recognise that 
they are unlikely to get all that was promised, yet they feel powerless 
to do anything about it because they believe that the ministry entrusted 
with protecting their interests has derailed the project. If and when the 
workshops are finally finished, the association may face even bigger 
problems. Since the number of workshops under construction will 
allow only about one firm in five to benefit from the new facility, most 
association members are likely to be veiy unhappy. 
4 INDUSTRIALISING CLUSTERS 
The second group of clusters consists of a metalwork cluster in 
Kumasi, Ghana, and two vehicle repair clusters, one in Nairobi and the 
other in Kumasi. These clusters in many ways resemble the three 
already described, but the greater specialisation and differentiation of 
firms leads to bilateral production linkages and, ultimately, to higher 
efficiency. Higher level technologies in al least some of the firms set 
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the stage for positive technological spillovers. Although associations 
are present in these clusters, their activities sometimes get derailed, 
either by internal power struggles or by external forces. The most 
active associations extend their concerns beyond basic supply-side 
matters to markets and technology. 
4.1 Metalwork in Suame, Kumasi (Ghana) 
Dawson (1988, 1992) described a cluster in Suame, a northern suburb 
of Kumasi. The cluster, known locally as 'Suame Magazine' because 
its original site once housed a military magazine, is involved in two 
activities: metalwork and vehicle repair. The working population of the 
magazine was estimated to be 40,000 in the mid 1980s, of which 8,000 
were shop-owning proprietors. These numbers do not include the 
spare-parts dealers and metal traders. 
Traditionally, the 'Magazine' craftsmen were involved in vehicle 
repair, with a small number of blacksmiths also producing basic 
agricultural tools, charcoal stoves, and other simple metal goods. Out 
of this base of blacksmithing has evolved a group of firms involved in 
various types of metal-work manufacturing. All of the metal-working 
linns spend at least some of their time doing repair and maintenance 
work, but all are also manufacturers. Dawson (1988) categorised them 
into three groups: blacksmiths who used clay and brick forges and 
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hand tools, a middle group who had achieved a modest level of 
technological enhancement, mostly with the use of locally made 
machines, and a group using machine tools, including at least one 
lathe, that Dawson calls 'engineering' workshops. 
5S4.1.1 History and turning-points of Suame metalwork cluster 
The site owes its existence to the forced removal of businesses from 
the centre of Kumasi in the 1950s and 1960s. The first turning-point 
came with the retreat of Ghana's formal economy from the mid-1970s 
onwards when 'even the least ambitious blacksmith added new 
products to his range or, at the very least, increased the volume of his 
production' (Dawson 1988: 27). Entrepreneurs saw vehicles lacking 
parts that could no longer be imported, and attempted to fabricate 
suitable spares. Others saw the need for food processing or agricultural 
equipment, and copied existing imported models. 
The market liberalisation of the mid-1980s was not uniform in its 
effects on the firms in the cluster. Declining markets and increased 
competition brought about the extremely low barriers to entry, drove 
many blacksmiths out of business, and reduced incomes for many 
others. Middle-level firms, especially those whose products were 
significantly inferior to their imported counterparts, were also affected. 
For both of these groups, therefore, the mid-1980s represented a 
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sharply negative turning-point in their operations. The engineering 
firms, on the other hand, fared much better. Their higher level 
technology enabled them to capture markets from both large domestic 
industry and from imports. 
4.1.2 Economic context for Suame metalwork 
Markets for the Suame cluster's products vaiy considerably. The bolts 
and nuts, brackets, springs, and agricultural implements produced by 
the blacksmiths have wider markets than die more specialised output 
of the engineering workshops. By the mid-1980s, both groups of 
products were competing with the flood of imports brought by 
liberalisation. Contrary to the expectations of many, goods produced 
in Suame fared well in competition with similar items from Eastern 
Europe and India. 
Suanie metalwork firms have probably not captured all available 
scale economies. The average size for developing country Anns is 15.4 
workers (see Table 2.1 above). In Suanie, the first two groups of 
producers average approximately 5 workers, while even the more 
sophisticated engineering workshops have only 7 workers each. 13 This 
suggests that the cluster's firms might benefit by expanding or by 
creating inter-firm division of labour through specialisation. 
The fact that all of Kumasi 's metal-working enterprises spend at 
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least some of their time doing repair and maintenance work suggests 
the existence of internal economies of scope. Such work complements 
firms' manufacturing activities by enabling them to utilise resources, 
especially labour, that might otherwise be idle. 
Problems associated with contract enforcement lead firms to prefer 
either cash payments or dealing with known persons (Fafchamps 
1996). Suame's smallest firms take deposits from clients, on accepting 
their orders, to cover the costs of materials. The greater a firm's output 
and the larger its client-base, the less likely it becomes that it will be 
able to rely on such pre-financing arrangements (Dawson 1988: 33). 
4.1.3 External economies in the Suame metalwork cluster 
As with the other small-enterprise clusters, market access is one of the 
major benefits of clustering. Dawson (1988: 32) observes that 
marketing is the metalworkers' greatest weakness. The firms make few 
efforts to advertise themselves and depend on informal contacts to 
spread their reputation. Obviously in such a situation, location in a 
place where they are likely to be seen and perhaps pick up some 
passing trade is especially beneficial. 
Suame producers, like those in Kamukunji, have benefited from the 
availability of inputs. The cluster has 'a large number' of traders of 
new and scrap metals (Dawson 1988: 11). Although some firms use 
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domestically produced steel rods and a limited amount of new steel 
imported by individual traders, the bulk of the materials used in the 
cluster are scrap (Dawson 1988: 31). As large firms began to be 
rehabilitated in the mid-1980s, supplies of scrap increased, then 
decreased as the pace with which old worn-out equipment was 
replaced slowed. 
The size of Suame firms, which average 5 -6 workers, suggests that 
labour-market pooling might be a more positive feature of the cluster 
than is the case in Kamukunji. Suame attracted two types of labour. 
The first consisted of workers who were apprenticed to small firms, 
many of them in Suame itself. Most (80%) of the workers in 
blacksmitln'ng and middle-level metalworking firms, and about half 
(52%) of those in engineering firms fell into this categoiy. The second 
type of labour available in Suame had higher level technical skills 
gained in large-firm apprenticeships and technical training institutes. 
Although these constituted a minority of workers, even in engineering 
firms, their presence has allowed the cluster to produce some items 
that compete favourably with imports. 
There is little evidence that technological spillovers were significant, 
despite the fact that a small group of linns - the engineering group -
was upgrading and benefitting from the Technology Consultancy 
Centre (TCC). The TCC helped engineering firms by importing 
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machine tools and assisting in product development. Although the 
blacksmiths and artisanal metalworkers occasionally made use of 
products made by local machine shops, they themselves continued to 
use old technology and were largely unaffected by the technological 
upgrading going on around them (Dawson 1992:38). 
4.1.4 Joint action among Suame metalworkers 
Suame's metalwork firms seem not to have strong linkages with each 
other, perhaps as a result of the wide variation within the group. 
Whatever the cause, there appear to be few horizontal or vertical 
linkages. There is no sectoral association of metalworkers. Rather the 
metalworkers are included under the umbrella of the Suame Garages 
Association described below. The problem with this, as with site 
associations in general, is that it is difficult for an association to 
represent well the interests of firms as diverse as upholsterers and 
engineering workshops (Dawson 1988: 46; Haan 1995). The 
metalworkers are similarly lacking in bilateral cooperation. A few of 
the more successful small enterprises established contacts with larger 
firms through their participation in the 1983 Industry and Technology 
Fair. In general, however, such joint action is rare. 
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4.1.5 Suame metalwork cluster: summary and conclusions 
Tlie Suanie metalworking cluster is large and diverse. A minority of 
firms is technologically sophisticated enough to be labelled 
'engineering. ' All of these use machine tools and most are equipped 
with at least one lathe. The rest of the cluster operates at a fairly low 
technological level. 
The analysis of potential external economies reveals a mixture of 
positive and negative effects. Being in the cluster facilitates market 
access and acquisition of intermediate inputs for the firms. Labour-
market pooling, however, has resulted in atomisation of low-level 
firms, rather than the development of specialised ones. The 
Technology Consultancy Centre, which might have been a source of 
general technological spillovers, apparently had an impact only on the 
small group of engineering firms. 
Linkages among Suame's metalworking firms and/or between these 
firms and others outside the cluster are weak. There is no association 
of metalworkers within the cluster, and little evidence of bilateral 
cooperation. The two firms with significant contacts outside the cluster 
were exceptional. 
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4.2 Vehicle Repair in Suame, Kumasi (Ghana) 
Dawson (1988) also described vehicle repair activities in Suame. 
Kumasi is a major centre for vehicle repair, attracting vehicles, not 
only from other parts of Ghana, but also from Niger, Togo, and Cote 
d'lvoire. Suame started as a vehicle repair centre and has gained a 
reputation for cheap, flexible service. At the time of Dawson's 
research in early 1988, 52% of the firms in the cluster were involved 
in some type ofvehicle work. 
4.2.1 History and turning-points for vehicle repair in Suame 
Kumasi has a long history in vehicle repair. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
five domestic and multinational concerns located large garages in the 
town. Until the early 1970s these garages dominated the local market 
for private vehicle repair. Magazine fitters, who were generally at a 
low level of technical skills, undertook only minor repairs and 
conversions of lorries into passenger-carrying vehicles. 
The first turning-point for Suame came with the 1972-73 budget, 
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which imposed tight restrictions on the importation of new vehicles 
and parts (Dawson 1988: 21). The large garages, which were capital 
intensive and dependent on imported inputs, suffered, and small firms 
in places like Suame were able to fill the gap. Furthermore, economic 
mismanagement encouraged an active black market in vehicle spares, 
which broke the monopoly of the large garages and opened up 
opportunities to small firms. 
From the mid-1970s, the range of clients and (he type of service 
demanded from small firms began to widen. Large and small, public 
and private organisations sent their vehicles for repair to Kumasi, 
because it was the only place where vehicle spares were consistently 
available. Vehicles were even brought in from neighbouring countries. 
Imported spares were obtainable on the black market and when they 
were not, artisans improvised. Furthermore, Suame repairs were also 
cheap because firms evaded minimum-wage laws and income taxes. 
Since many of the artisans were present or former employees of large 
firms, the work was generally of a reasonable quality. 
The boom continued, with minor interruptions, until the mid-1980s 
when the Economic Recoveiy Programme (ERP) look hold. Reforms 
in the import and currency markets encouraged the importation of 
spare parts, vehicle components, and entire vehicles. Although the 
majority of the spares went to the large commercial and coiporate 
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garages, these garages did not regain their former supremacy. The 
corporate garages were busier than they used to be because the 
corporations they served had more vehicles on the road, but (his 
increase in activity seems not to have affected adversely the small 
Anns in Suame. What did suppress demand for repairs was rising parts 
prices combined with a fall in the purchasing power of many vehicle 
owners. From the mid to the late 1980s nearly 70% of the sampled 
firms experienced a fall in demand and many went out of business 
(Dawson 1988: 24). 
4.2.3 Economic context for vehicle repair in Suame 
The market for vehicle repair in Kumasi consists of the government, 
private firms and organisations, and individuals. Most (96%), however, 
described their customer base as consisting largely of individuals. 
During the 1970s when Suame established its reputation, the number 
of vehicles was shrinking, but their poor condition, the access of 
Suame to spares, and the availability of cheap fuel led to high demand 
for its services. After the introduction of the ERP, Ghana's vehicle 
fleet grew, vehicles were in better condition (though hardly new), 
imported spares competed directly with Suame-made spares, and some 
of the larger garages started operating again. 
The market for vehicle repair is highly competitive. Estimates are 
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not completely reliable, but probably at least three thousand of 
Suame's reported five thousand workshops are involved in some 
aspect of vehicle repair. Add to this the few large garages that had 
resumed operations by the mid-1980s and small and medium 
workshops in other parts of Kumasi, and die result is intense 
competition. Most firms seemed to just wait for business to come to 
them, but Dawson (1988: 25) describes two entrepreneurs who 
maintained linkages over a number of years with larger firms and 
state-owned enterprises which did not have their own garage facilities. 
These were the only two firms reporting an increase in business in the 
1985-1988 period. Apparently the links gave them a competitive 
advantage in Suame's otherwise ruthless competition. 
The vehicle repairers in Suanie followed a pattern of specialisation 
similar to those in Thika. The largest group of firms were the 
mechanics (39.5% of the enterprises); straighteners and welders were 
next (25.4%), followed by upholsterers (8.4%), electricians (8.1%), 
sprayers (7.8%), and others (8.9%). Joint production through 
subcontracting should allow the cluster to reap the benefits of scale 
economies, even as the size of individual firms remains small. 
F inns ' exchange relations with suppliers and customers changed 
from the 1970s to the 1980s as a residt of changes in Ghana's 
economic environment. During the 1970s, much of Suanie operated on 
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the fringes of legality. The firms, of necessity, used black market 
spares and, like many small businesses in developing countries, they 
failed to comply with labour laws and other regulations. When the 
new government that came to power in 1979 promised to attack 
corruption and the black market, many entrepreneurs began turning 
down work coming from government ministries and state-owned 
enteiprises. By the mid-1980s, market liberalisation had reduced the 
need for black market spares, so on at least that front, the vehicle 
repair firms were able to operate more freely. 
Dawson (1988: 23) claims that small enterprise in Ghana had 
'traditionally' been heavily dependent on credit, with materials and 
parts often purchased and jobs done on a 'pay later' basis. This also 
began to change with the economic refonns introduced in the 1980s. 
As Hie government tightened the money supply, offering credit became 
more expensive and was consequently less common. 
4.2.4 External economies in Suame Magazine 
Market access is, once again, a major external economy. The 
concentration of vehicle repair firms brings customers. This apparently 
offsets the lack of advertising or other forms of marketing (Dawson 
1988: 17). 
Like Thika, Suame appears vulnerable to disabling labour-market 
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pooling. Many young people train as apprentices, but instead of joining 
an existing business and thus enabling it to realise economies of scale, 
they most often set up their own business in direct competition with 
their former master. Nevertheless Suame's vehicle repairers manage 
to achieve greater efficiency than many small-enteiprise clusters 
because the overall volume of business seems greater and the 
subcontracting system enables the small enterprises as a group to 
achieve basic scale economies. 
The supply of intermediate inputs changed drastically with 
liberalisation. Before liberalisation, firms used either scrap metal from 
old vehicles, which was readily available from vehicles abandoned as 
beyond repair in Suame, or black market spare parts. Since 
liberalisation, these have been replaced by three new lines of supply: 
'imitation parts' from Nigeria; relatively low price, low quality parts 
from Eastern Europe, India, and China; and, increasingly, parts made 
in the machine shops in Suame itself. These last include locally 
manufactured bolts and nuts, brass bushes, exhaust pipes, axle-shafts, 
and various body brackets (Dawson 1988: 23). These machine shops 
also recondition and/or manufacture parts on a one-off basis. The 
intermediate input effects are closely linked to market access in this 
case. When spares were difficult to get, customers knew that they 
would somehow be available in Suame, and this reputation for 
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availability of needed parts attracted customers. 
The small engineering workshops in the metalwork sector have 
contributed substantially to the technological capability of small 
vehicle repairers (Riedel and Schmitz 1989: 147; Dawson 1992: 
37-38). The ability of these small machine shops to make both 
machines used in the repair process and vehicle spare parts has enabled 
the repairers using those goods to occupy niches that would otherwise 
be beyond their reach. Not all garages have, or even need, higher 
technology. Dawson (1992: 38) reports that, although the engineering 
workshops are important, they are few, and most garages continued to 
use the same hand tools as before. What is important is that the 
technology is present somewhere within the Magazine so that it can be 
tapped when needed. 
4.2.5 Joint action among Suame vehicle repairers 
The Suame vehicle repair cluster is characterised by extensive 
horizontal subcontracting linkages as well as by vertical linkages with 
the engineering firms producing spare parts. Subcontracting has linked 
small firms within Suame, and resulted in joint production. Although 
the Suame Magazine was begun by former employees of large firms, 
there is little contact between these large firms and Suame's small 
garages. 
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Strong vertical bilateral linkages between garages and metal 
workshops, mostly the engineering firms, lead to another form of joint 
production. A mechanic in need of a pari goes to an engineering 
workshop carrying the old part. The workshop may either rework the 
existing part or make a new one using the old as a model. The 
mechanic then fits the part and continues with the rest of the repair job. 
The Ministry of Industries created the Suame Garages Association 
in 1983 to act as a two-way communication channel between 
government and artisans, as well as a delivery vehicle for programmes 
of assistance (Dawson 1988: 46). At the time of the research the 
association was helping to select enterprises which were to benefit 
from a World Bank transport sector credit line. It was also involved in 
nominating candidates for courses at the National Vocational Training 
Institute and Management Development and Productivity Institute. In 
both instances, the association was having difficulties; this may be, as 
Dawson suggests, because it represents too wide a diversity of trades 
and activities with firms of too many sizes and types. It may also be 
that the association, as a creation of Government, lacks legitimacy and 
the support of its members. 
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4.2.6 Suame vehicle repair cluster: summary and conclusions 
Despite a growing market and fairly impressive technological 
capability in some of its engineering workshops, most firms 
experienced a fall in demand and many went out of business. Dawson 
(1988: 24) rightly observes that Suame may be a victim of its own 
success. Its reputation as a thriving centre for small-scale enterprise 
attracts trainees and potential entrepreneurs in large numbers, witli the 
result that most end up in enterprises too small to be efficient. 
Linkages between metalwork manufacturers and vehicle repair firms 
within Suame have probably helped the cluster to do as well as it lias, 
but they have not been strong enough to enable it to weather the cut-
throat competition that has developed. The skills developed in the 
engineering workshops when spares were difficult to obtain continue 
to serve the cluster well, because the existence of the local workshops 
enable vehicle repairers to take on jobs that would otherwise have to 
be done in one of the large garages. There is some indication (only 2 
firms!) that linkages between small and large firms are important (see 
Alila and McCormick 1997). The lesson here may, however, not lie in 
the linkage. Rather, the important point may be that these two firms 
developed active marketing strategies that enabled them to avoid the 
intense competition that was enmeshing most of their counterparts. 
The Suame Garages Association, on the other hand, has not been an 
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effective vehicle for joint action. Government and donors have planned 
assistance packages without adequate consultation, and the small 
vehicle repairers seem unable to organise for their effective use. 
4.3 Vehicle Repair in Ziwani (Kenya) 
Ziwani is a cluster in the Eastlands of Nairobi. At the time of the 
research in 1996-97, the cluster had 506 enterprises crowded into a 
1.2-acre site. All were small, and all were engaged in vehicle repair or 
spare parts manufacture (McCormick et al. 1996). 
Working spaces within the cluster are allocated on the basis of 11 
named specialisations. According to Kinyanjui (1997), general 
mechanics represent the largest proportion of Ziwani repairers (22.4% 
of the total), followed closely by panel beaters (20.2%), spray painters 
(18.2%), vehicle-wiring specialists (18.2%), and gas and electrical 
welders (8.1%). Four other specialisations account for only 12.9% of 
the enterprises.14 
All types of vehicles are repaired in Ziwani. All firms report 
repairing heavy lorries, 97% repair matalus, and 94.9% repair private 
saloon cars. The vehicles are mostly over six years old, and many 
linns said that they often repair vehicles in the 16-20 year age range. 
In Nairobi as in Thika, newer vehicles are more likely to be repaired 
in the large formal garages. 
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4.3.1 History and turning-points 
Ziwani shares part of its history with Kamukimji. The cluster was 
founded by entrepreneurs relocated from other parts of Nairobi in 1972 
(Kinyanjui 1996:14-15). Another influx of artisans from the Grogan 
site arrived in 1978, and there was a spurt of firm formation in 
1989-90. These combined with a rather steady pattern of new business 
startups to bring the total to its present 500+ enterprises. 
The cluster has experienced two major turning-points. The first 
coincided with the 1985 legitimation of the jua kali. The president's 
action and (he resulting changes in attitudes brought about growth and 
improved infrastructure in the Ziwani cluster. Ziwani was also one of 
the early beneficiaries of the Kenya Government's Jua Kali Shed 
Programme described earlier. The second turning-point came with 
market liberalisation and the accompanying massive importing of 
second-hand vehicles and spare parts. 
4.3.2 Economic context for Ziwani vehicle repair 
As in Thika, the market for vehicle repair is shared by the large formal 
garages, medium-scale garages, and small shops, including the jua kali 
enterprises. Also similar to Thika is the concentration on the repair of 
older vehicles. Heavy commercial vehicles and matatus predominate. 
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but nearly all Ziwani firms also repair private saloon cars. 
The overall market for vehicle repair is much larger in Nairobi than 
in Thika. Nairobi's population, estimated at 1.8 million in 1996, 
extrapolates to a vehicle population of at least 28,000. The fact that 
Nairobi is the industrial and commercial capital of Kenya as well as its 
political capital suggests that the vehicle population may actually be 
much higher. Furthermore, the main trunk road system, centered in 
Nairobi, is estimated to carry up to 90% of the country's heavy truck 
traffic (World Bank 1995). Of course, the population of mechanics is 
also considerably larger than Thika's, and without a full census it is 
difficult to estimate the degree of market saturation. 
Most Ziwani vehicle repairers (78.1%) specialise in only one of the 
11 repair types. The rest undertake between two and four different 
repair activities. As in Thika, some of the combinations appear to fit 
together and are often stages of a single repair job. This happens, for 
example, when a firm specialising in panel beating also does spray 
painting, or a wiring specialist also does welding. Such combinations 
may result in economies of scope, especially in cases where there is 
not enough demand to permit a firm to expand with a single 
specialisation. 
Ziwani firms, with a mean of only 1.5 workers, are more like the 
firms in Thika than those in Suame, Kumasi, which average 6.5 
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workers (Kinyanjui 1996). This suggests that there may be unrealised 
economies of scale in Ziwani. 
Contract enforcement is important in Ziwani, because of the 
extensive use of subcontracting. When the subcontractor defaults or 
fails to perform to the required standard, the main contractor may 
handle the problem himself or the contract parties can request the 
Ziwani Jua Kali Association to arbitrate. The association's willingness 
to enter into (lie role of arbiter of disputes between member firms is an 
important step towards institution building. By providing sanctions for 
firms that attempt to act opportunistically, the Ziwani association is 
reducing the risks of doing business with its members and 
strengthening the overall business environment. Trust remains a key 
factor in the selection of subcontract firms, but the development of a 
mediation process allows firms to move (using Zucker's [1986] 
categories) from process- and/or characteristic-based trust towards 
institutionally-based trust 
4.3.3 External economies 
As with most small-enterprise clusters, the geographical concentration 
in Ziwani brings major benefits in the form of market access. 
Kinyanjui (1997) reports that nearly half (46.1%) of customers simply 
arrive at the repairer's place of work. The rest are brought by other 
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customers (40.4%) or by friends (13.5%). When asked the advantages 
of being in the cluster, all of the businesses named 'availability of 
customers' either first or second. 
Three-quarters (75.5%) of the entrepreneurs in Ziwani had no 
occupation before starting their present business and a sizeable 
majority (69.9%) of the artisans were trained in Ziwani itself 
(Kinyanjui 1997, 1998). These facts suggest that, like Suame and 
Thika, Ziwani could suffer from disabling labour-market pooling . 
Closer investigation, however, shows that relatively few firms are the 
recent startups one would expect to find if young people were going 
into business in Ziwani immediately after training. The firms that were 
founded in 1991 or later (14% of the total) are hardly enough to cause 
a major competitive threat to existing entrepreneurs. 
Ziwani includes 30 manufacturing firms producing vehicle parts, 
machines, and household goods (McCormick et al. 1996). The vehicle 
parts manufactured include silencers, rubber bushes, chassis, and car 
seat cushions. The two spares shops run by the association stock these 
local manufactures as well as imported and/or domestic spares. 
Despite the presence of shops in the cluster, three-quarters (75.8%) of 
the repairers buy spares on Kirinyaga Road, an area known for its high 
concentration of autospares shops, and half (50.5%) purchase some 
spares in (lie industrial area. All in all, autospares are readily available 
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to Ziwani firms. 
In general, Ziwani 's potential for technological spillovers is very 
similar to that of Thika. Vehicle repairers readily share ideas and 
information about repair procedures, but what they share is limited by 
their lack of current technical knowledge. The choice of Ziwani by the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UN I DO) for its 
training facility offers the promise at least of technological upgrading. 
UNI DO has sponsored the building of a training facility for skill 
development and also provided equipment for use in Ziwani. The 
building was originally projected to have been completed by mid-
1997, but is unlikely to be ready before mid-1998. 
4.3.4 Joint action 
As with vehicle repair elsewhere, the subcontracting system in Ziwani 
gives rise to horizontal linkages among small firms with different 
specialisations. Almost all (99%) of the firms subcontracted work out, 
and an equally high proportion reported receiving subcontracts 
(Kinyanjui 1998). Subcontracting relationships are long-lasting. Over 
one-quarter of the enterprises (26.8%) said that they never change 
subcontractors, while more than half (59.8%) said that they change 
only infrequently. 
Other bilateral linkages are weak or non-existent. Approximately 
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one-quarter (24.7%) of the Ziwani firms reported exchanging 
equipment with other enterprises (McCormick el al. 1996). There may 
be somewhat less bilateral sharing than in other clusters because the 
Ziwani Association has purchased some items that it makes available 
to members. Like their counterparts in Thika, Ziwani entrepreneurs 
have few links with vehicle assemblers or large-scale garages 
(Kinyanjui 1998). 
Ziwani entrepreneurs have strong multilateral linkages through the 
Ziwani Jua Kali Association. All (100%) enterprises in Ziwani are 
members. The association is involved in the general management and 
administration of the cluster (Kinyanjui 1996: 15-16). As already 
described, the association acts as a mediator in disputes between 
member enterprises. It is also attempting to improve the image of the 
cluster by strengthening general discipline within and around the site 
and by taking measures to control theft and the sale of stolen vehicle 
parts. Tin's is being done, according to association officials, in order to 
make the cluster more attractive to potential customers. 
The Ziwani Jua Kali Association has spearheaded several other 
specific joint actions. To ensure security of tenure for the enterprises, 
it purchased the Ziwani site from the Nairobi City Council. The 
association has also purchased industrial gas cylinders which it makes 
available to members, thus reducing their capital costs. In 1997, it 
79 
ids Dp 110. 295 
enabled members to obtain Kenya's new identification cards with 
minimum effort, by arranging for registration to be carried out at the 
Ziwani site. 
The Ziwani association is, however, not without its problems. In 
1996 the secretary absconded with a large sum of money, leaving the 
members demoralised. The present leadership appears to be honest, but 
it has not been successful in all its undertakings. Despite 
improvements in organisation, Ziwani still has a clear jua kali image 
that frightens away many potential customers. The association is also 
engaged in a dispute over the land that is taking a considerable amount 
of the officials' time. In an important effort at future planning, it 
applied for a bank loan to enable it to purchase diagnostic equipment 
for repairing the Dubai cars. When the application was refused on the 
grounds that the association had no legal standing to borrow, the 
officials turned to the government for help. Here also they were 
rebuffed. It seems that MRTTT sees these businesses as jua kali that 
should not aspire to major upgrading. The association now intends to 
ask a donor for funds so that it can buy the equipment without 
involving either banks or government. 
4.3.5 Ziwani motor mechanics: summary and conclusions 
Currently the main external economy available to the Ziwani vehicle 
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repair cluster is market access. The atmosphere is ripe for positive 
technological spillovers, but neither the promised training programme 
nor the high-tech equipment needed for diagnosing and repairing new 
vehicles appear to be forthcoming. 
The strength of the cluster is in its linkages. Like its counterparts in 
Thika and Suame, the cluster is characterised by strong production 
linkages. Nearly all of the firms give and receive subcontracts. Much 
subcontracting is a sharing of work based on firm specialisations, but 
a small proportion represents sharing of jobs within a given 
specialisation, usually because an entrepreneur has more work than he 
can handle. As a result, Ziwani's artisans seem to be able to work 
efficiently enough to compete in Nairobi's vehicle-repair market. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that these enterprises are tiny, even 
compared with other African vehicle repairers. The issue of mergers 
or other types of combinations to achieve greater scale economies did 
not come up in this research. 
The Ziwani Jua Kali Association has followed through on the 
difficult process of purchasing the Ziwani site, and is now seeking 
funds to enable the cluster to invest in new technology. It is this last 
effort that may prove most telling. If they can obtain the equipment 
and related training to enable them to enter successfully into the 
market for repair of the current generation of vehicles, the jua kali will 
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have reached a new level of acceptability and integration into the 
process of Kenyan industrialisation. 
The cluster repairs all types of vehicles. This means that its market 
is potentially as wide as Nairobi. In fact, most vehicles presently 
repaired in Ziwani are old even by Kenyan standards, association 
officials believe that, to attract the owners of newer vehicles, the 
cluster will require both technological upgrading and an improved 
image. Recognition of the need to attract customers is one thing that 
sets the Ziwani association apart from most small-enterprise 
associations. It is a positive development that deserves support. 
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5 DIVERSIFIED INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERS 
Clusters that either include medium or large Finns, or have clear links 
to such finns or to other larger organisations appear to be rare in 
Africa. The secondary literature yielded only two clear examples of 
such diversified industrial clusters. Both are in South Africa, and both 
produce garments. One, the Western Cape clothing cluster, was well 
described and is included here. The second garment cluster is based in 
Durban. Since the available study analyses only a portion of it - a 
concentration of subcontractors in Port Shepstone (Harrison 1997) -
an assessment of the cluster as a whole was not possible. The third 
example, Kenya's Lake Victoria fish processing industry, comes from 
our own research. 
5.1 The Clothing Industry in the Western Cape (South Africa) 
South Africa 's Western Cape accounts for 45% of local clothing 
production and half of the country's total clothing exports. It also 
dominates the production of higher-quality, 'fashion' clothing 
(Wilkens and Kane 1997). October (1996: 17) argues that the 
proximity of retailers and manufacturing in the Western Cape is the 
cluster's most important feature. He believes that the presence of the 
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large retailers and the manufacturers' almost total reliance on these 
distribution channels has affected the size and structure of the firms in 
the industry, the state of the region's design capacity, its quality 
standards, and the development of highly dependent subcontracting 
and marketing relationships. 
5.1.1 History and turning-points of the Western Cape clothing 
cluster 
Until the 1920s, clothing in South Africa was either imported or 
tailored (October 1996). The beginnings of the cluster seem to be 
associated with the development of the textile industry in the Western 
Cape. Whatever the original impetus was, the cluster has grown from 
30 factories employing 3,500 workers in 1935, to over 500 factories 
with 47,000 workers in 1994 (see Table 5.1). 
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Table 5.1: Western Cape Clothing Factories 
Year Factories Employees 
1935 30 3,500 
1940 40 4,772 
1950 104 13,204 
1960 166 19,787 
1970 253 37,743 
1980 332 53,421 
1990 433 54,267 
1994 538 46,868 
Source: October 1996: 6 
The data in Table 5.1 suggest two turning-points in the histoty of the 
Western Cape clothing cluster. The first was in the 1940s when the 
number of factories and workers nearly tripled. According to October 
(1996), import difficulties during World War II account for this major 
expansion in the domestic clothing industty. The cluster continued to 
grow steadily for the next three decades. Employment nearly doubled 
during the 1960s, and increased by 42% in the 1970s. By the 1980s, 
however, growth slowed. The 1990s have witnessed a drop in total 
employment despite increases both in the number of firms and in 
exports. 
October (1996: 6 - 7 ) explains the latest turning-point in terms of the 
opening up of the South African economy. The decline in production 
and employment, he believes, was mainly due to an increase in imports 
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of new and second-hand clothing. After a small improvement between 
1993 and 1994, employment declined again in 1995-96 due to further 
tariff reductions and illegal imports. Exports also increased, but still 
account for only 10% of local production. 
5.1.2 Economic context for clothing production in the Western 
Cape 
Clothing is a buyer-driven industry. The organisation of the industry, 
types of interfirm cooperation, and profit levels are primarily 
determined in the case of South Africa, by the major retailers, design 
houses, and foreign buyers (October 1996: 16). South African markets 
are much more developed than those in other African countries. This 
is not surprising, since both per capita incomes and populations are 
higher. South Africa 's 1995 per capita income of US$3,160 was over 
six times the average for Sub-Saharan Africa, and its population of 
41.5 million is the fourth largest on the African continent (World 
Bank 1997). South Africa's superior infrastructure and well-developed 
retail sector also mean that clothing producers can more easily reach 
a national market. 
The size of the firms in this cluster suggests that obvious economies 
of scale have already been realised (see Table 5.1). The cluster 
contains a mix of firms of different sizes and levels of integration 
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(Wilkens and Kane 1997). The largest share of production and 
employment is concentrated in a few large firms. The 20 largest firms 
have more than 300 workers; 66 firms have 100 to 300 employees 
each. At the low end of the cluster structure are 138 films with 
between 5 and 100 workers and 146 firms with fewer than 5 
employees. Almost half of these small firms are subcontractors. There 
has been a significant increase in the number of home-based 'Cut, 
Make, and Trim' firms (CMTs) in the past five years. October (1996: 
25) mentions the existence o f ' m i n i clusters' of up to 100 small firms 
within the region. Such mini-clusters seem to consist of firms with 
similar specialisations and/or characteristics. 
On the surface, South Africa appears to have better developed 
institutions than most Sub-Saharan African countries. We would, 
therefore, expect trust to be higher and the institutions governing 
exchange to be more facilitative. The unevenness of South African 
development, however, makes it difficult to judge the extent to which 
specific business owners can rely on the institutions to support their 
entrepreneurial activity. 
Specific arrangements in force in the CMT trade favour the agents 
and larger producers. The general practice is for marketing agents to 
give and receive production orders. Broken agreements between 
marketing agents and CMTs usually centre on late deliveries and/or 
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poor product quality. In such cases, the CMT firm is liable for a daily 
penalty for lateness and must bear the cost of rejected goods. 
5.1.3 External economies in the Western Cape clothing cluster 
External economies in the Western Cape cluster appear fairly strong. 
Eighty percent of firms identified the close proximity to retailers, 
availability of skilled labour, and access to specialised services as 
advantages to locating in the Western Cape (October 1996: 21). 
Although some firms are technologically advanced and even welcome 
others to see their factories, technological spillovers did not rate highly 
as an advantage of the cluster. 
Access to the market may be the major benefit of locating in the 
Western Cape clothing cluster. Since only a small proportion of firms 
export, access to the retail chains that dominate the domestic market 
is a decided benefit for any firm. The headquarters of all but one of 
these major chains are located in the cluster, as are the major mass 
suppliers to the lower and mid-upper ends of the market. The Western 
Cape cluster is the main supplier to these chains. 
The cluster contains nearly 47,000 employees ofgannent firms, and 
an additional 23,000 workers in related industries (October 1996: 7). 
This certainly seems to be a significant pool of labour available to the 
gannent industry. It is not, however, clear from the description of the 
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cluster what skills these workers have and whether skill levels have 
been increasing. 
Although the cluster includes textile firms, and a large number of 
specialist firms linked to the clothing industry, such as fabric printers, 
suppliers of trims, and vendors of new and second-hand machinery, 
clothing producers obtained less than one-quarter (22.4%) of their 
intermediate inputs from within the region (October 1996). 
The introduction of the latest technology in the industry has been 
limited to large- and medium-sized firms who have mainly adopted 
computerised pattern designing, marking, and grading (October 1996). 
Most small firms, on the other hand, have no specialised machinery. 
The closure rate for small (inns is also veiy high, limiting the 
possibility of technological spillovers from the larger enterprises. 
A characteristic of the Western Cape Clothing Cluster, which sets it 
apart from many of the enterprise clusters discussed in this paper, is 
the ease with which information is disseminated. October (1996: 14) 
reports that 'all firms interviewed had visited other factories to look at 
new technology or different forms of work organisation such as just-
in-time.' One of die large, technologically advanced firms, has an open 
door policy and welcomes a large number of firms to its factories. 
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5.1.4 Joint action in the Western Cape clothing cluster 
The Western Cape cluster has extensive horizontal and vertical 
linkages that have resulted in various forms of joint action. Horizontal 
cooperation between firms at similar stages of the production process 
is common (October 1996: 13-15). Finns cooperate to handle large 
orders, present joint clothing ranges, share information, use marketing 
agents jointly, and lend machinery. Cooperation on producing for the 
export market is growing. The cluster is also characterised by 
specialisation and subcontracting. Design houses, firms specialising in 
cutting sci vices, and a large number of pleating firms have emerged in 
the last decade or so. Subcontracting in the cluster falls into one of two 
categories: operations which require highly specialised equipment and 
skilled labour, and operations which are simple and labour-intensive. 
Horizontal multilateral cooperation is institutionalised in various 
associations and organisations. There are two employer organisations: 
the Cape Clothing Manufactures Association (CCMA) and the 
Garment Manufacturers Association (October 1996: 15) The CCMA 
represents mainly the larger and more established manufacturers. In 
1994, it had a membership of 108 firms, or 35% of all firms registered 
with the Industrial Council. The Garment Manufacturers Association 
(GMA) represents just over 40 small firms. Another association, the 
Mitchells Plain Garment Manufacturers Association, has recently 
90 
ids Dp 110. 295 
emerged. The associations are active in industrial relations, but they 
are also attempting to undertake new roles, including the screening of 
foreign exports of fabrics and other inputs, small firm development, 
and the dissemination of information. The GMA is frequently used as 
a source of information by manufacturers needing specialised CMTs. 
The relationships formed within the association have also led to 
sharing of orders, passing on of work, and sharing of information 
(October 1996: 16). 
The Western Cape cluster has significant vertical linkages. One of 
the changes in die cluster noted by October (1996) was the growing 
cooperation between retailers and manufacturers on clothing design 
and fabric selection. Such bilateral cooperation is accompanied by 
vertical joint action among groups of firms. Groups of companies who 
are not direct competitors use the same agent to market their products. 
These are used mainly by the medium-sized companies to obtain 
orders from retailers located outside of Cape Town. A potentially 
more important type of agent has arisen in the export market. A 
number of companies in Cape Town who export to Germany are using 
the same agents. According to one of the companies interviewed, these 
agents play an important role in transferring information and design 
techniques, and ensuring quality standards (October 1996: 15). 
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5.1.5 The Western Cape clothing cluster: summary and conclusions 
Understanding the distribution channels and the role of traders is 
particularly important for analysing the Western Cape clothing cluster. 
Retailers are crucial to the domestic market and a new type of 
marketing agent could become key to gaining the cluster a place in the 
world market. 
The cluster has, over its fairly long history, developed significant 
external economies. Location within this cluster brings clear benefits 
of market access, availability of intermediate inputs, labour-market 
pooling, and, to a lesser extent, technological spillovers. Technological 
spillovers have the potential to be significant, especially since large 
(inns seem veiy willing to share information with one another. 
Benefits from all of these external economies mainly accrue to the 
large and medium-scale producers. 
Cooperation between large and medium-scale producers is beneficial 
to all, but small firms in die cluster appear to be relegated to low-
profit activities that give them little opportunity to develop. Small-firm 
joint action, on the other hand, is weak. The main association of 
smaller firms - the Garment Manufacturers Association - has only 40 
members. A second one is forming, but it is localised in the Mitchell's 
Plain Hive, so it may not have cluster-wide impact. 
Few films are exporting. Small firms seem least likely to enter 
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export markets on their own and may not benefit much from doing 
CMT work for larger exporters. An important development in the 
cluster is the emergence of a new type of agent who selves the 
exporting firms by transferring information, disseminating design 
techniques and ensuring quality. 
5.2 Fishing and Fish Processing at Lake Victoria 
Kenya's Lake Victoria fish cluster encompasses industrial fish 
processors and their supply beaches. Most of the industrial processors 
are located in Kisiunu, a town on the shores of the lake. All produce 
frozen and/or chilled fish fillets mainly for the export market. The fish 
is supplied by traders operating in and through some 65 fishing 
beaches on the Kenyan side of the lake (Ogutu 1988). For purposes of 
understanding their structure and dynamics, one was selected for 
intensive investigation (McCormick et al. 1995, 1996; Mitullah 1996, 
1997, 1998). Although that cluster - Uhanya Beach - may or may not 
be representative of the population, much can be learned by 
examining its activities through the lens of collective efficiency. 
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5.2.1 History and turning-points of the Lake Victoria fishing cluster 
Lake Victoria lias had a long history of artisanal fishing. The Luo 
people, who live around the lake, enjoyed fish as a part of their normal 
diet. The lake had a variety of species and artisans caught, processed, 
and to a limited degree, traded many of them. Activity in places like 
Uhanya Beach grew slowly through the 1970s, with most of the 
impetus coming from increased trade for a widening local market. 
The early 1980s brought a major change in Lake Victoria fisheries. 
Three factors converged to bring about what has been called the Nile 
Perch boom (Mitullah 1998). The first factor was a virtually untapped 
supply of large fish, the Nile Perch, which British scientists had 
introduced into Lake Victoria in 1954 (Geheb 1997: 68-69). The 
second factor was the demand for quality fish by consumers in 
industrialised countries, which continued to grow as fish supplies in 
northern waters dwindled (Jansen 1996). The third factor, which has 
largely been overlooked in existing studies of this industry, was the 
presence in Kenya's Asian community of both capital and 
entrepreneurial skills (Hinibara 1994). The result was the 
establishment in Kenya of a major fish-processing industry that by 
1995 was exporting over 12,000 tonnes of Nile Perch valued at US$ 29 
million, most of it destined for markets in Europe, Japan, Israel, and 
North America (Kenya 1995b).15 
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Fish supplies began to fall in the early 1990s as a result of poor 
fisheries management. Four main factors appear to explain the falling 
c?tch: overfishing, the practice of catching juvenile perch, trawling, 
and the spread of the water hyacinth weed (Mitullah 1998). The first 
three factors are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. As overfishing 
reduces the supply of large fish, some fishermen - especially those 
with traditional non-motorised boats - begin to use smaller nets that 
bring smaller fish. As more and more small fish fail to mature, the 
problem grows. Other fishermen with more resources have responded 
to the diminishing catch by trawling, a practice which, if carried out 
during the breeding season, can destroy nursery grounds. The spread 
of the water hyacinth has effectively closed many fishing beaches and 
reduced fishing opportunities for artisanal fishermen.16 
Despite shrinking supplies, the industry at all levels continued to be 
profitable until, in early 1997, two people in Spain died of salmonella 
poisoning after eating Nile Perch imported from Uganda. Spain 
immediately imposed a ban on imports of East African Nile Perch. 
Other European countries followed suit, and then the European Union 
(EU) acted on behalf of all its members to ban Nile Perch imports. The 
effect on Kenya's fish industry was immediate and devastating. 
Factories that had been supplying the European market had to cut 
production drastically pending a visit by EU inspectors. Prices at the 
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beaches chopped from K.shs 50 per kilo to 25 per kilo almost 
overnight. When the inspectors came to Kenya, they found that the 
handling of fish was unsatisfactory both at the beaches and in the 
factories. At Ulianya Beach, the main problem was the way fish was 
moved from the boats to the factories' refrigerated trucks. Fish was 
often dragged along the ground and then thrown on the dirty cement 
floor of the cooperative's weighing shed or banda. From there, agents 
of the large-scale processors selected the best of the catch and placed 
them on ice in insulated trucks to be transported to the factories. Some 
factories were also cited for poor sanitation, and the inspectors 
outlined new procedures that had to be followed by processors 
exporting to the EU. 
The response to the shock was mixed. Some processors used to 
operating in less fussy markets made few changes as a result of the EU 
inspection visit. Those processors who depended on the European 
market cooperated both with the inspectors and the Kenyan health 
authorities to improve conditions within their factories. Several made 
major investments to ensure that they could comply with EU 
standards, and at least one sought and obtained ISO 9000 certification. 
The change in Uhanya Beach was dramatic. A visit to the beach in 
June 1997 revealed a new banda located only a few metres from the 
water's edge. Fish were being transported suspended from poles to 
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ensure that they did not touch the ground. Upon reaching the banda, 
they were washed in chlorinated water and placed on a clean surface 
for selection. The fish selected by the factoiy agent received a second 
dipping into salted, chlorinated water before being placed in the truck. 
The whole process, including the investment in banda and water 
treatment facilities, was the result of a collaboration between Uhanya's 
largest trader and one of the large-scale fish processors. 
5.2.2 Economic context for fishing and fish processing 
Most Kenyan Nile perch is destined for the lucrative export market. 
Europe, as already indicated, is the most discriminating market. Its 
quality standards are very high, and because Europe is now essentially 
one market, a problem perceived in one country quickly spreads to all 
of the others. Kenyan fish is also exported to Japan, Israel, and North 
America. Most of the processors claimed not to know the final 
destination of their fish. Their customers are importers who resell the 
fish to others. Only one company mentioned specific uses, such as fast 
food chains in Japan and supermarkets in North America. 
The export market is large. No fish processor reported lack of 
demand. On the contrary, most could sell much more, if they had 
larger supplies of raw fish. The domestic market is both smaller and 
more diverse. Fresh and frozen Nile Perch are sold to hotels, 
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institutions and retailers, mainly in Nairobi and the larger towns. 
Artisanally processed fish, which is very popular in the western part 
of Kenya, finds its way to markets throughout the country. Finally, 
there are markets for various fish by-products. The so-called 'fish 
frames ' , the skeletons remaining after factories complete the filleting 
process, are demanded both by those processing for low-income 
consumers and as an input into the fish meal animal feed manufactured 
by several large factories in Kenya. The fish bladders are a food 
delicacy in China, and an ingredient in isinglass, a substance used, 
among other things, for making glue and clarifying wine. 
It is difficult to assess the availability of economies of scale. Most 
fish processors were operating under capacity, many at only one-third 
or one-half of potential output. This suggests that economies of scale 
should be realisable, although the fact that the larger factories tended 
to operate more than one production line indicates that physical scale 
economies may be quickly reached. Export processing may, however, 
give rise to certain managerial economies resulting from the need for 
marketing, financial, and bureaucratic expertise.17 
No obvious economies of scope emerged from our interviews of the 
large-scale processors. On the other hand, most processors seemed 
uninterested in the possibility of diversifying into products that might 
offer such economies. Only one large firm indicated that it was 
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considering processing other types of fish, or developing new Nile 
Perch products. 
The institutions governing exchange relations generally benefit the 
large-scale processors and their agents at the expense of the fishermen. 
Transactions between traders and/or agents and the individual 
fishermen are normally in cash. There are, however, some exceptions. 
Mitullah (1998) reports that Uhanya's largest trader has formal 
arrangements with three factories that guarantee him future payment 
should he supply fish worth more than the cash the driver is carrying. 
According to one factory owner, most processors enter into a verbal 
or written agreement with their agents that specify a fixed price, but 
allow for certain variations. One informant described the power of the 
truck drivers who often double as agents: 
Imagine a driver who has six tonnes of fish in a seven-tonne 
truck. When a fisherman comes late, the driver says that he can 
only buy at 20 shillings per kilo. The driver has been authorised 
to pay 35 shillings per kilo, so the difference is his. 
Agents do not always honour their agreements. One beach ran into 
serious difficulties when an agent defaulted on his contract with a 
factoiy and absconded with his cash advance. 
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5.2.3 External economies in the Lake Victoria fishing cluster 
Market access is an important consideration for fishermen and traders 
operating within Uhanya beach. Fishermen who land their fish at 
Uhanya have ready access to the daily line of trucks taking fish to the 
factories and, if some or all of their catch on a particular day is not up 
to factory standards, there are plenty of traders and local processors 
who will buy the 'rejects'. This no doubt explains why 86.7% of the 
fishermen interviewed said that, if they were forced to relocate they 
would move to a similar cluster. 
Small-scale traders also find Uhanya a convenient location. The road 
is better than the roads to many beaches, and the area is served by 
matalus (public mini-buses) and buses that enable small-scale traders 
to move quickly to other locations. Most small traders (65.8%) felt that 
they would not obtain the same results in a different location. Most of 
these pointed to market factors as the reason why they prefer Uhanya: 
Uhanya is an active beach and their customers are there. The largest 
traders, on the other hand, were less wedded to Uhanya. Although 
they recognised that Uhanya has 'easy transport and a good landing 
bay ' , they felt that they could be as successful elsewhere as long as 
there was a good transport system. 
Labour-market pooling does not seem to be a major source of 
external economies in the cluster. Both fishing and fish processing 
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can, according to the respondents, be learned in less than two months 
by even the slowest learner. Workers in factories seem to require only 
minimal skills. 
Although some inputs are available within Uhanya, fishermen and 
arlisanal processors have to travel as far as Kisumu, some 65 km. 
distant, for others. The major inputs into factory production are 
electricity, water, chemicals for water treatment and fish sterilisation, 
fish and packaging materials. Both electricity and water are 
problematic throughout Kenya, forcing business owners to invest in 
backup facilities, but other inputs seem to be easily available. 
Technological upgrading has taken place in a number of factories 
and at selected beaches as a result of the EU's inspection visit. The 
upgrading of the factories seemed to happen on a factory-by-factory 
basis, depending on whether the particular producer intended to export 
to the EU. The relative isolation of the factories from each other works 
against any real spillovers. Beach upgrading, similar to what happened 
at Uhanya Beach, has taken place at least one other beach. Within 
Uhanya Beach, however, we saw no evidence that the improved fish 
handling techniques developed for the new banda had been adopted by 
others in the cluster. 
101 
ids Dp 110. 295 
5.2.4 Joint action among fishermen, traders and fish processors 
Joint action in this cluster needs to be considered in three parts: first, 
for actors in Uhanya Beach; second, for the industrial processors; and 
finally, for the two together. 
In Uhanya, little effective horizontal joint action exists at any level. 
Although at first sight, horizontal cooperation appears to be strong, 
with 90 per cent of the fishermen belonging to the Yimbo Fishermen's 
Cooperative Society (YFCS), nearly all members reported that the 
Cooperative had no role in the two potentially most important forms 
of cooperation: price setting and quality control (Mitullah 1998: 44). 
Furthermore, despite awareness that access to cold storage would give 
fishermen an advantage in bargaining with processors over fish prices, 
no action has been taken. Apart from a few ice boxes on individual 
fishing vessels, cold storage facilities are entirely lacking. 
Strategically, this is a serious collective failure, because it means that 
fishermen will continue to be price-takers at the mercy of traders and 
processors. Fishermen, aware that the cooperative was not benefiting 
them, registered a parallel association in 1993, but when YFCS 
officials used their political power to force fishermen to pay 
commissions to the cooperative, the new association fell dormant. 
Most fishermen (93.3%) are also members of the Uhanya Beach 
Organisation. This association, however, primarily addressed welfare 
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rather than business concerns. More than half (56.7%) of the fishermen 
subcontracted out some service activities such as net repair, boat 
repair, and transport (Mitullah 1998. 41). This probably increased 
efficiency marginally, but did not seem to be a major feature of their 
operations. 
Perhaps even more surprising than the lack of joint action in Uhanya 
is the almost total absence of cooperation among (he industrial 
processors. Their small numbers, geographic proximity, and for the 
majority, ethnic affinity, woidd seem the ideal backdrop for co-
operation. Yet they have no sectoral organisation, and our interviews 
revealed a great deal of mistrust among them. None of them believed 
that an association or other form of cooperation would be beneficial. 
One even said that he often saw one of his competitors near his plant 
with binoculars! Despite this general lack of cooperation, business 
owners did respond when called by government health officials to 
meetings prior to the EU inspection. 
Unlike most of the clusters considered thus far, the most significant 
joint action in Lake Victoria's fish cluster has been vertical. Trading 
linkages have spawned vertical bilateral joint action. Mitullah (1998) 
describes a veiy strong vertical linkage between Uhanya Beach and the 
industrial processors that has resulted in the beach upgrading. A large 
trader, responsible for more than half of the fish trade in Uhanya, has 
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formal arrangements with three industrial fish processors. This is 
unusual and, apparently, each factoiy considers this person to be 'its' 
agent at Uhanya. It was this trader, working with one of his partners, 
who was responsible for the upgrading that enabled Uhanya to 
continue supplying fish to the European market. 
Many of the large-scale processors also have strong vertical linkages 
to particular importers in Eiuope, but these linkages apparently did not 
result in assistance or investments to enable the factories to meet EU 
standards. Rather, each factoiy that chose to upgrade its facilities did 
so on its own with internal or borrowed capital. 
5.2.5 Lake Victoria fishing: summary and conclusions 
Effective vertical bilateral joint action has, for the moment at least, 
worked in the Lake Victoria fishing cluster. Uhanya Beach has been 
upgraded to the point where it can continue to provide fish acceptable 
to large-scale processors exporting to the European market. 
Undoubtedly large profits are accruing to the partners in this action: 
Uhanya's largest trader and the factoiy he worked with. This trader's 
other partners seem to be unknowing free riders, also profiting from 
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the investment. It is also true that the action, by restoring fish prices to 
their pre-shock levels, has preserved incomes for over 500 tiny 
enterprises within Uhanya Beach. 
The cluster has been less successful in dealing with the continuing 
problem of dwindling fish supplies. Many of the industrial processors 
seem to be trying to make up for the shortfall by getting fish from 
other parts of the lake. No one really seems interested in addressing the 
root of the problem which is, according to environmentalists and other 
key informants, overfishing and, especially, the practice of taking 
undersized fish. Only one factory considered getting Nile Perch from 
sources outside of Lake Victoria. Such a move would, if feasible, 
benefit the firm in question but the increased supply would probably 
mean lower prices for the lake's fishermen. Similarly, only one large-
scale firm expressed any interest in diversifying its products to include 
either other types off ish or higher-level processing. It would seem that 
either strategy would remove some of the pressure for continually 
increasing Nile Perch supplies from the Lake fisheries, while at the 
same time allowing large-scale factories to maintain or increase 
profits. Here again, such strategies would mainly benefit the factories 
and would run the risk of reducing the prices paid to fishermen. 
Fishermen and small-scale traders and processors are especially 
vulnerable because they have no effective mechanism for collective 
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action. Jt would appear that the development of (he cluster has been 
accompanied by growing income inequality. Large-scale processors 
and traders have prospered while aiiisanal fishermen and processors, 
and small-scale traders have benefited only marginally (Milullah 1998: 
33). Existing cooperatives have been ineffective in dealing with 
critical upgrading issues. New mechanisms for horizontal joint action 
are evidently needed Fishermen need (he freedom to form associations 
that they believe will work for their interests, and to drop out of those 
that provide no benefits. Traders have this freedom and mosl have 
chosen not to belong to any existing business association. Perhaps an 
investigation into the reasons for this would shed further light on the 
rather complicated issue of horizontal linkages among small firms. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper began with a question: Is the metalwork cluster in 
Kamukunji, Nairobi, part of Africa's industrialisation process? 
Analysis of the internal workings and external environment of clusters 
in Africa suggests that the answer must be 'yes' , but that this is not the 
end of the story. Enterprise clusters in Africa are at very different 
levels of development, and their ability to contribute to 
industrialisation varies accordingly. 
Clusters can and do further the industrialisation process, but they do 
so in different ways. Those in the first group make their contribution 
mainly by building a productive environment that, in some respects at 
least, prepares the ground for the emergence of collective efficiency. 
Clustering clearly facilitates market access and allows some firms to 
produce their goods in quantity. Some may then make the transition 
to factory production, while others combine craft methods with 
increasing mechanisation. The fact that the firms are clustered also 
encourages associational activity to begin. It is no coincidence that 
associations in such clusters usually focus 011 efforts to improve 
working conditions within the cluster or gain access to needed 
supplies. Infrastructure, especially water, electricity, and access roads 
are the most basic needs of industrial production. Without them, these 
clusters are unlikely to move ahead. 
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The second group of clusters has much clearer signs of emerging 
collective efficiency. These clusters are already industrialising, but 
remain limited by the weak technology of most of the firms and the 
frequent sidetracking of associational activity. Firm sizes in these 
clusters are similar to the first group, but the greater specialisation and 
differentiation of firms leads to bilateral production linkages and, 
ultimately, to higher efficiency. Higher-level technologies in at least 
some of the Finns sets the stage for positive technological spillovers. 
In cases where basic infrastractural and input needs have been met, 
associations can begin to deal with issues of markets and technology. 
The Western Cape clothing cluster and the Lake Victoria fish cluster 
include large- as well as small- and medium-size firms. Tliey aim for 
wider markets, both national and foreign, and are generally able to 
produce competitively. Here, however, the resemblance between them 
ends. The Western Cape cluster is situated squarely within the 
industrialisation process. Market access, labour-market pooling, 
intennediate input effects, and technological spillovers are all present 
and positive. The cluster is characterised by extensive and varied 
linkages - bilateral and multilateral, vertical and horizontal - that 
result in joint action in production and 011 key issues affecting the 
cluster. The greatest need in this cluster and others like it is for 
continuing market analysis, focused particularly on the export market, 
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and for upgrading die small-firm segment of the cluster to encourage 
more equal sharing of benefits. The existing associations can probably 
handle the first task, but the small firms may need the assistance of 
government or NGOs in their efforts to strengthen their position. 
The Lake Victoria cluster, on the other hand, is fragile. It has 
weathered an important storm in the EU quality shock, but its weak 
mechanisms for joint action raise questions about its ability to step up 
output and quality. The unequal power relations between the fishermen 
on the one hand, and the large traders and processors 011 the other, 
mean that even when the cluster prospers, benefits are not well shared. 
Furthermore, the challenge of dwindling fish supplies has not been 
adequately dealt with. All of these problems suggest that those 
concerned need to work together. This will probably require new forms 
of public-private partnership. 
The analysis raises other issues that cut across the three groupings of 
clusters. The first of these has to do with the interplay of market access 
and firm growth. Across the clusters analysed there is evidence that 
clustering reduces the growth constraints frequently identified in the 
literature on small enterprise. The most notable example is access to 
markets. All clusters have been able to attract customers, from traders 
to final consumers, as a result of the concentration of producers. The 
problem is that the size of the markets they are connected to in most 
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cases remains small. This may partly explain why specialisation and 
skill development have failed to develop veiy far in most of the small-
enterprise clusters as well as why the middle-sized firms, generally 
found in clusters elsewhere, are missing. 
Another issue that cuts across the cluster groupings concerns the 
relationship of institutions to cluster development. Institutional issues 
take at least two different forms. The first is the failure in many 
instances of institutionalised cooperation, especially associational 
activity, to improve cluster operations. One would expect that 
associations and cooperatives, as vehicles for bringing together 
persons with similar interests, would be strong forces for positive joint 
action. Yet our findings indicate that this is frequently not the case. 
Some, like the Uhanya cooperative, are viewed as milking the 
membership. Others seem to get sidetracked or bogged down in a 
single difficult problem. The reasons advanced to explain particular 
cases often do not apply more generally. For example, both the Ziwani 
Jua Kali Association and the Suame Garages Association were 
creations of government rather than of the membership. Yet one 
appears to be at least attempting to address the cluster's strategic 
needs, while the other is languishing as a government 'errand boy'. 
Research focused on these institutions and their multiple linkages and 
interests is probably needed to assess their potential role as engines of 
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cluster development The second institutional issue concerns the effect 
of weak institutions on exchange relations and, ultimately, on the 
cluster's performance and growth. In several clusters, for example, we 
observed that producers' lack of ability to enforce commercial 
contracts narrows the market and/or limits operations to cash 
transactions. Such a situation constrains business activity and makes 
a firm vulnerable to theft, sometimes on a large scale. Much more 
research, especially comparative research, on the development of 
economic institutions needs to be undertaken. Such research should 
consider social and political, as well as economic factors affecting the 
genesis and growth of institutions. 
Repair activities figure prominently in several clusters; some engage 
in both repairs and manufacturing. The relationship of repairs to 
manufacturing is an important one, not only because it offers some 
firms the opportunity to realise economies of scope, but also because 
industrial history in many countries and sectors shows manufacturing 
growing out of repairing. This is beginning to happen in some of the 
clusters studied. Whether significant small-scale manufacturing can 
develop from these activities will depend, among other things, on the 
size of the market these manufacturers can access and their ability to 
compete, in terms of quality and price, with newly available imports. 
Many of the small-enterprise clusters derive in one way or another 
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from the implementation of government spatial policies barring certain 
activities from residential areas and central business districts. The 
relocation of businesses has created new clusters. Kamukunji, Thika, 
Ziwani, and Suame are all the result of such 'forced agglomeration'. 
It is interesting to note, however, that many of the enterprises that were 
forced into these clusters were already clustered elsewhere. The new 
cluster then consisted of one or more groups of enterprises from other 
locations that were later joined by others, who moved in individually 
or started their businesses in the new cluster. In such circumstances, 
forming a group identity can be a slow and painful process, as 
producers may tend to hold on to old allegiances. In the Thika cluster, 
for example, the Mariko Jua Kali Association is a carryover from the 
former market site. Although it is a welfare, rather than a business 
association, many of its members apparently felt that one association 
was enough and did not bother to join the site association until very 
recently. This may partly explain the lack of effective joint action in 
the Thika cluster. 
The analysis suggests that there is plenty of scope for positive 
intervention at both policy and programme levels in enterprise clusters. 
If, as appears to be the case, clusters further the industrialisation 
process, then countries with industrialisation on their development 
agenda would do well to enact policies favourable to cluster formation. 
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Such policies might include incentives for producing firms of varying 
sizes to locate within clusters, priority to clusters in infrastructure 
decisions, and encouragement of associational activity. At die level of 
programmes, both government and non-governmental organisations 
can assist the development of collective efficiency: providing business 
ideas and training to encourage the emergence of specialist producers, 
traders and service enterprises, or strengthening cooperation between 
enterprises. The measures to be considered include: subsidising visits 
to trade fairs or joint stands at such fairs, support for standardisation, 
support for arbitration services, or fostering cooperation between 
enteiprises through external assistance. 
This paper has attempted to draw together information from a 
relatively small group of studies. Most of these have their origins in 
small-enterprise research, and all come from a few countries in 
English-speaking Africa. Inclusion of other clusters in other countries 
might modify these results. Studies that compare clustered with 
isolated firms in the same industry might shed new light 011 the effects 
of clustering. Further exploration of aspects not well covered in the 
studies reviewed here, such as the institutional framework, and social 
and political variables, will also help to deepen our understanding of 
the functioning of clusters. These considerations notwithstanding, it 
appears that enterprise clusters can be one way towards 
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industrialisation for African countries. Supporting enterprise clusters 
may not result in industrialisation tomorrow. But informed support, 
which recognises that clusters have different needs at different stages 
of development, will probably help it to happen sooner rather than 
later. This is an important finding for associations, governments, 
donors, and those businesses that make clusters their home. 
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NOTES 
1. This paper is one of the outputs of the Kenya portion of a larger 
project on Collective Efficiency and Small-scale Industry, directed by 
Hubert Schmitz of the Institute of Development Studies at the 
University of Sussex, and funded by the Department for International 
Development, London. We are grateful to many people for their input 
and assistance, but most especially to Hubert Schmitz, whose patient 
leadership and insightful comments have helped to shape our work in 
Kenya. I also appreciate those who provided valuable comments on 
various versions of this paper: Raphie Kaplinsky, Patrick Alila, Poul 
Ove Pedersen, John Humphrey, Hermine Weijland, Catherine 
Masinde, Brian O'Riordan, Khalid Nadvi, Winnie Mitullah and Mary 
Kinyanjui. Finally, my thanks go to the staff of the Institute for 
Development Studies, University of Nairobi, for the logistical support 
that has made the work run smoothly. 
2. Jua kali, the Swahili words for 'hot sun', was originally used to 
refer to artisanal manufacturing and repair businesses that operate 
without shelter, but has gradually broadened to cover many types of 
small enterprises. 
3. This notion of cluster, while it shares its geographic dimension with 
the growth centres described in the regional planning literature, is 
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different in at least two important respects. The cluster is a work place, 
consisting of various types of business enterprises. Even if people 
reside within its boundaries, the analytical unit remains an enterprise 
grouping. The growth centre, on the other hand, is an urban space that 
includes residential units, schools, places of worship, health facilities, 
etc. as well as businesses. The second difference is the sectoral 
concentration of the enterprise cluster, which need not be present in the 
growth centre. 
4. The literature 011 networks and linkages in business is large and 
growing. Useful summaries are contained in Mead (1994) and 
McCormick and Atieno (1997). 
5. The terms cooperation and joint action are used interchangeably 
in this paper to mean 'working together for the same end', i.e. the 
active aspect of collective efficiency. Linkages, 011 the other hand, are 
ties between or among firms that may or may not result in joint action. 
6. Information in this paragraph was collected by the author in 
November 1997 with assistance from Betty Munyendo. 
7. Based 011 an interview with the secretary of the Kamukunji Jua Kali 
Association, November 1997. 
8. Field notes of personal interview with founder of Kamukunji Jua 
Kali Blacksmith and Tinsmith Society, 19 June 1986. 
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9. Field notes of personal interview with founder of Kamukunji Jua 
Kali Blacksmith and Tinsmith Society, 19 June 1986. See also King 
(1996). 
10. This section is based on an interview in November 1997 with an 
artisan who was among the first to make wheelbarrows in Kamukunji 
in 1984. 
11. From field notes of interview with Kamukunji Jua Kali 
Blacksmith and Tinsmith Society, 19 June 1986. 
12. Matatus are small public transport vehicles. In Thika and other up-
country areas, most are 11-14 passenger vans or converted pick-up 
trucks. On many Nairobi routes, larger mini-buses with up to 30 seats 
are used. 
13. These averages were calculated from grouped data in Dawson 
(1988: 15). 
14. Cushion-makers are one of the eleven repair specialisations, but 
their data are included with manufacturing. 
15. Values stated in Kenya shillings have been converted to US 
dollars at a rate of K.shs.51.4 to one dollar. This is the mean of 
monthly rates for 1995 as reported in The Monthly Economic Review 
for September 1996 (Central Bank of Kenya 1996). 
16. By providing breeding space for other species of fish that are part 
of the perch 's diet, limited amounts of water hyacinth could actually 
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lead to an increase in Nile Perch in the lake. Nevertheless, the present 
uncontrolled spread of the weed threatens fishermen's livelihoods. 
See Penrose (1959: 92ff) for a discussion of managerial economies of 
size and growth. 
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